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HOLMES AND THE ROMANTIC MIND
ANNE C. DAILEY†
ABSTRACT
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is perhaps best known for his “tough-
minded” jurisprudence based on objective standards of reasonable-
ness. Scholars have traditionally understood Holmes’s jurisprudential
outlook as fundamentally behavioristic. Professor Dailey challenges
that understanding, revealing the importance of Romantic psychology
in Holmes’s major writings. His outlook, she argues, was shaped by
his belief in unconscious motivations, imagination, irrationality and
instinctual drives. Rather than simply characterize Holmes as a
“Romantic,” Professor Dailey draws out the conflict in his thought,
illuminating his struggle to develop an empirical approach to law that
could also account for the depth and complexity of human nature.
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A keen, slender, stridulous vibration—almost too fine for the
hearing, weaving in and out, and in the pauses of the music dividing
the silence like a knife—pierces my heart with an ecstasy I cannot
utter. Ah! what is it? Did I ever hear it? Is it a voice within, answer-
ing to the others, but different from them—and like a singing flame
not ceasing with that which made it vocal?1
INTRODUCTION
The jurisprudence of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is not usually
associated with the poetry of Wordsworth, Shelley and Coleridge, the
novels of Goethe, or the philosophy of Fichte, Schelling, and Carlyle.
In fact, eighteenth-century Romanticism2 seems directly at odds with
the scientific empiricism of Holmes’s professional writings: the “bad
man” view of lawyering;3 the positivist definition of law as
prediction;4 the enthusiasm for the “master of economics” and
1. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to William James (Apr. 19, 1868), quoted in
RALPH BARTON PERRY, THE THOUGHT AND CHARACTER OF WILLIAM JAMES 92-93 (Harvard
Univ. Press, briefer version 1948) (1935).
2. The use of the term “Romanticism” in this Article is discussed in Part III.A. Briefly,
the term “Romantic” is used here to denote the counter-Enlightenment ideas about human
nature present in the work of a wide and varied group of writers, critics and philosophers across
France, Germany and England during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As
explained below, Romantic psychology stressed the powers of intuition and imagination,
subjective experience, psychic conflict, irrationality, nature and inner transcendence. See infra
notes 283-95 and accompanying text.
This Article assesses the place of Romantic ideas about human nature in Holmes’s
jurisprudential work. The focus here is on his early theoretical writings, speeches, and
correspondence, and not on his later decisions as a Supreme Court Justice. Although it is my
belief that Holmes’s Romantic psychology played a role in his later decisions, including his
post-World War I First Amendment opinions, I do not develop that thesis here. For an
example of a Holmes opinion that uses language reflecting a Romantic view of the
unconscious, see Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 598 (1907) (stating that the
reasoning of an administrative body expresses “an intuition of experience which outruns
analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions . . . which may lie beneath
consciousness without losing their worth”).
3. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897)
[hereinafter The Path of the Law], reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES
391, 392 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995) [hereinafter COLLECTED WORKS] (“You can see very
plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a good one for wishing to avoid an encounter with
the public force, and therefore you can see the practical importance of the distinction between
morality and law.”).
4. See, e.g., id. at 460-61 (“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”).
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quantitative decisionmaking;5 and the external standard of liability.6
Even the discovery of Holmes’s romance with Lady Castletown7 has
done little to alter the views of a legal world long accustomed to the
idea of Holmes as a “tough-minded,” unsentimental legal thinker.8
Yet as this Article explains, the central tenets of Romantic
psychology occupied an important place in Holmes’s jurisprudence.
Taken together, Holmes’s published writings, speeches and
correspondence offer a view of human nature strongly reminiscent of
eighteenth-century Romantic literature and philosophy. Like the
Romantic writers he read most frequently—notably, Wordsworth,
Coleridge, Carlyle and Goethe—Holmes asserted the existence of
such fundamental and nonempirical psychological concepts as
unconscious motivations, instinctual desires, inner conflict,
irrationality, imagination and transcendent faith in “the infinite.”9 His
two most important jurisprudential works, The Common Law and
The Path of the Law, incorporate a view of individuals as intuitive
beings whose rational faculties can be overcome by deep-seated
instincts and unconscious passions. His letters, speeches, journals and
reading lists document his abiding interest in the idea of an active and
creative mind endowed with native faculties and capable of intuitive
insight. Alongside his celebrated enthusiasm for empirical science lay
5. See, e.g., id. at 469 (“For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the
man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of
economics.”).
6. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co. 1881) [hereinafter THE COMMON LAW] (“The law considers, in other words,
what would be blameworthy in the average man, the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence, and determines liability by that.”).
7. In 1985, a trove of letters written by Holmes to Lady Clare Castletown, the wife of an
Irish Baron, was discovered. Written over a three-year period from 1896 to 1899, the letters
reveal Holmes, 55 years old and married at the time, to have been passionately and somewhat
impulsively in love. See David J. Seipp, Holmes’s Path, 77 B.U. L. REV. 515, 534-37 (1997)
(excerpting several of the 103 letters from Holmes to Lady Castletown that have been
preserved).
8. The term “tough-minded” as applied to scientific empiricism comes from William
James. See WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF
THINKING 262-63 (1907). In a letter to James written after receiving a copy of Pragmatism,
Holmes conceded: “You would say that I am too hard or tough-minded.” Letter from Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. to William James, quoted in David A. Hollinger, The “Tough-Minded”
Justice Holmes, Jewish Intellectuals, and the Making of an American Icon, in THE LEGACY OF
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 216, 218 (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992).
9. The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 459, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 3, at 392 (“I do not say that there is not a wider point of view from which the distinction
between law and morals becomes of secondary or no importance, as all mathematical
distinctions vanish in presence of the infinite.”).
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an irrepressible Romantic appreciation for the hidden depths of
human experience.
Holmes’s interest in the study of human nature dates from his
earliest years. He never doubted that legal thinkers with philosophi-
cal ambitions must master many disciplines.10 “If your subject is law,”
Holmes admonished, “the roads are plain to anthropology, the
science of man, to political economy, the theory of legislation, ethics,
and thus by several paths to your final view of life.”11 Holmes read
widely in the area of philosophical psychology12 and many of his
closest associates, including William James, were themselves
psychologists.13 The record he kept of his reading shows that Holmes
pursued the study of psychology throughout his life; in addition to
general philosophical texts on psychology, Holmes read influential
psychology treatises by Alexander Bain, Henry Mansel, and Henry
Maudsley.14 Holmes was especially interested in the commentary
generated by Sir William Hamilton’s critique of associationist
psychology and John Stuart Mill’s famous reply.15 In the two decades
following the publication of The Common Law, Holmes read books
on psychology by Paul Bourget, Lloyd Morgan Conway, Richard von
10. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., The Profession of the Law [hereinafter The
Profession of the Law], in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 471, 472 (“To be master of
any branch of knowledge, you must master those which lie next to it; and thus to know anything
you must know all.”).
11. Id.
12. See Eleanor Little, The Early Reading of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 8 Harv. Libr.
Bull. 163, 170-72 (1954) (listing the following among Holmes’s readings: John William Draper,
A History of the Intellectual Development of Europe; George Henry Lewes, Biographical
History of Philosophy from Its Origins in Greece Down to the Present Day; David Masson,
Recent British Philosophy: A Review, with Criticisms; Including Some Comments on Mr. Mill’s
Answer to Sir William Hamilton; John Daniel Morell, An Historical and Critical View of the
Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century; and Albert Schwegler, History of
Philosophy).
13. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 181.
14. See Little, supra note 12, at 172, 175 (noting that Holmes read the following works:
Alexander Bain, The Emotions and the Will; Henry Mansel, Prolegomena Logica: An Inquiry
into the Psychological Character of Logical Processes; and Henry Maudsley, The Physiology
and Pathology of the Mind).
15. In addition to reading Hamilton’s Metaphysics and John Stuart Mill’s An Examination
of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, Holmes also read the following works commenting on
that debate: James Hutchison Stirling, Sir William Hamilton: Being the Philosophy of
Perception; David Masson, Recent British Philosophy: A Review, with Criticisms; Including
Some Comments on Mr. Mill’s Answer to Sir William Hamilton; James McCosh, An
Examination of Mr. J.S. Mill’s Philosophy; and Herbert Spencer, The Test of Truth. See id. at
171-74.
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Krafft-Ebing, Emile Laurent, Morton Prince and William James.16
Holmes’s lifelong interest in psychology reflected his belief that the
“rational study of law” must take into account “the nature of man’s
mind,” a source, he emphasized, even “further back than the first
recorded history.”17
The psychological concept most salient in Holmes’s early legal
writings was the notion of the unconscious. From the first pages of
The Common Law, Holmes developed a model of legal decision-
making founded on the idea of “unconscious” factors and dedicated
to the process of identifying those factors no longer serving socially
useful ends.18 As Holmes argued, legal decisionmakers, including
legislators, must take responsibility for uncovering these hidden
factors when fashioning legal rules.19 The view of the unconscious as
encompassing ideas and feelings not readily accessible to awareness
was not the entire picture, for Holmes viewed the unconscious in
dynamic terms as well. Instinctual drives such as revenge, possession,
sexual satisfaction and self-preservation color the pages of Holmes’s
early jurisprudential works20 and relate to his idea of unconscious
forces directing individual behavior in hidden, conflicting, and
seemingly irrational ways.
The notion of the creative imagination also occupied an impor-
tant place in Holmes’s legal thought, particularly with respect to his
understanding of the source of moral values in law and his
professional ideal of heroism.21 Holmes is somewhat misleadingly
famous for his description of the “bad man” lawyer,22 which has led
many, if not most, commentators to the mistaken conclusion that
16. See Notes of Mark DeWolfe Howe, Holmes’s Reading List (Years 1890-1902) (on file
with the Harvard University Law School Library) [hereinafter Notes of Howe, Holmes’s
Reading List].
17. The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 477, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 3, at 405.
18. See THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 1.
19. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text. 
21. See The Profession of the Law, supra note 10, at 472-73 (“For I say to you in all
sadness of conviction, that to think great thoughts you must be heroes as well as idealists.”).
These ideas are more fully explored infra Part III.C. For a discussion of the creative
imagination in Romantic thought, see JAMES ENGELL, THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION:
ENLIGHTENMENT TO ROMANTICISM (1981). For an examination of the Romantic conception of
judging as reflected in nineteenth-century judicial biography, see Susanna Lynn Blumenthal,
Law and the Creative Mind, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 1998).
22. See The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 459, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS,
supra note 3, at 392; THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 17, 110.
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Holmes maintained strictly amoral views of both law and lawyering.23
Yet as Holmes emphasized many times, his theory of the bad man
lawyer was simply a heuristic device for predicting how courts will
decide cases.24 By utilizing the idea of the bad man, Holmes did not
mean to deny the ethical claim that there exists “a wider point of
view from which the distinction between law and morals becomes of
secondary or no importance, as all mathematical distinctions vanish
in presence of the infinite.”25 Indeed, the bad man’s image is
overshadowed by an ideal of professional heroism to which Holmes
himself openly aspired. For Holmes, heroic greatness inhered in the
lawyer’s ability to harness his imaginative powers in pursuit of
transcendent insight.26 Heroism, a central Romantic concept, counters
the moral relativism of the bad man lawyer by locating the source of
moral truth in the creative and unconscious processes of the
individual mind. Holmes’s ideal of professional heroism resonates
with a psychology that emphasizes imagination over reason,
unconscious over conscious processes, and intuition over empirical
truth.
Holmes’s struggle to reconcile his Romantic view of human
nature with his more “tough-minded” belief in the relevance of
empirical science to social policy became a central dynamic in his
jurisprudential writings. This struggle was also a central characteristic
of the Romantic thinkers Holmes admired. Romanticism celebrated
the individual as well as the whole, imagination as well as reason,
revolution as well as tradition, autonomy as well as determinism, free
will as well as duty. As one critic has observed, “These contradictions
cannot be simply charged to the factional divisions within the
romantic movement, for they are endemic to every genuinely
romantic thinker; rather, they should be seen as a manifestation of
the ‘contradictoriness, dissonance and inner conflict of the Romantic
23. See, e.g., Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 225-26 (1964)
(discussing Holmes’s “detachment” from morality). Compare Mark DeWolfe Howe, The
Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1951) (addressing the criticisms of
Professor Lon Fuller and others who concluded that Holmes espoused an amoral view of the
law) with Henry M. Hart, Holmes’ Positivism—An Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV. 929, 930
(1951) (stating that Howe’s view “just does not wash”).
24. See The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 459, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS,
supra note 3, at 392 (“If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to
predict . . . .”).
25. Id.
26. See infra Part III.C.
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mind.’”27 Conflict rather than synthesis marks the Romantic
temperament, and in this regard especially Holmes revealed his
Romantic sensibilities. With respect to legal issues, Holmes often
managed this conflict by staking out different positions in response to
different legal questions. His belief that common law liability should
turn upon the consequences of objective behavior rather than
subjective motivation28 appealed to him in part because he knew that
human motivations are often the product of unconscious and
irrational feelings. Rather than reflecting a behaviorist view of
human nature, one that ignores questions of consciousness
altogether,29 the external standard likely resulted from Holmes’s
appreciation for the dynamic depths of human experience. In
discussing other topics, such as the human instinct for revenge or his
ideal of legal professionalism, Holmes emphasized the importance of
going beyond external behavior to consider the inner realm of
unconscious desires and subjective motivations.30
The Romantic elements in Holmes’s work have not gone entirely
unnoticed by commentators.31 His biographer, Mark DeWolfe Howe,
27. Dmitri N. Shalin, Romanticism and the Rise of Sociological Hermeneutics, 53 SOC.
RES. 77, 80 (1986) (quoting Isaiah Berlin, Preface to H.G. SCHENK, THE MIND OF THE
EUROPEAN ROMANTICS at xxii (1969)).
28. See THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 38 (“[W]hile the terminology of morals is still
retained, . . . the law . . . is continually transmuting these moral standards into external or
objective ones . . . .”).
29. Consciousness is irrelevant to the pure behaviorist thinker:
Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely experimental branch of natural
science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection
forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent
upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of
consciousness.
John B. Watson, Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It, 20 PSYCHOL. REV. 158, 158 (1913); see
also DANIEL N. ROBINSON, AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 340 (3d ed. 1995)
(“The behaviorism of John B. Watson was no less than the insistence that a scientific
psychology must concern itself only with behavior and must abandon all interest in
consciousness, mental states, introspection, unconscious processes, and other ‘ghosts.’”).
30. See THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 41-42 (arguing that the law should gratify the
community’s passion for revenge).
31. See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING
YEARS: 1841–1870, at 53-59 (1957) [hereinafter HOWE, SHAPING YEARS]; RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 463 (1990) [hereinafter POSNER,
JURISPRUDENCE] (mentioning the Romantic elements in Holmes’s thought); Thomas C. Grey,
Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 857-58 (1989) (mentioning aspects of
Emersonian Romanticism in Holmes’s thought); Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Early Critical
and Philosophical Writings of Justice Holmes, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1221, 1227-28 (1989) (examining
Holmes’s early idealism); David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial
Restraint, 44 DUKE L.J. 449, 464-88 (1994) (drawing a connection between Nietzsche and
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acknowledged Holmes’s early interest in Platonism and neo-Classical
aesthetics; while he was at Harvard College, Holmes published essays
on both Plato and Albert Durer that revealed his early interest in
philosophical idealism.32 Along with these essays, his relationships
with Emerson and his father, his sporadic references to the
“infinite”33 and the “universe,”34 and his notion of heroic greatness
have from time to time prompted critics to question the degree of
Holmes’s commitment to scientific empiricism. Howe concluded that
Holmes’s early interest in philosophical idealism reflected “a
moderation in his empiricism which time and experience were to
destroy.”35 Others have resolved the apparent inconsistency in
Holmes’s views by concluding that Holmes adopted a stance of
scientific empiricism in his professional writings but relegated his
philosophical interests to “a sphere of personal life.”36 More recently,
critics have attempted to resolve the perceived tension in Holmes’s
work by reconceiving his ideas as “neo-pragmatist.”37 Overall, the
Romantic elements in Holmes’s writings have been at worst ignored,
and at best treated as youthful or minor lapses from a mature
commitment to the late-nineteenth-century scientific worldview.38
Even the more moderate view of Holmes as a neo-pragmatist fails to
take full account of the undeniably Romantic elements in his work:
                                                                                                                                     
Holmes); Ruth Gavison, Holmes’s Heritage: Living Greatly in the Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 843,
844 (1998) (mentioning Romanticism as an aspect of Holmes’s life and work). For an
interesting discussion of Romanticism in law and literature, see RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW
AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 137-55 (1988).
32. See, e.g., HOWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 31, at 53-56. See generally Hoffheimer,
supra note 31.
33. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L.
REV. 443, 463 (1899), reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 406, 420 [hereinafter
Law in Science]; The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 459, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS,
supra note 3, at 392.
34. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., The Use of Colleges [hereinafter The Use of
Colleges], in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 483, 483; OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.,
The Soldier’s Faith [hereinafter The Soldier’s Faith], in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at
486, 487.
35. HOWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 31, at 55-56.
36. Hoffheimer, supra note 31, at 1227.
37. Grey, supra note 31, at 789; see also sources cited infra note 42.
38. The exceptions here are POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 31, at 239-44 and
Luban, supra note 31, at 464-68, both of whom emphasize the Nietzchean element in Holmes’s
thought. Professor Luban concludes that both Holmes and Nietzche exhibited a “repudiation of
subjectivity and the importance of our conscious thoughts.” Luban, supra note 31, at 465 n.41;
see also POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 31, at 240-41 (describing Holmes and Nietzsche
as “sub- or antimentalists”). This Article argues, to the contrary, that Holmes’s Romanticism
lay in his appreciation of subjective experience and the importance of unconscious processes.
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his emphasis on inwardness, the unconscious, conflict, irrationality,
intuition, inner transcendence and heroic greatness.
The study of Holmes’s psychology is not undertaken here for the
simple purpose of reconceptualizing Holmes as a Romantic rather
than a utilitarian, pragmatist or other kind of thinker. While this
Article does clarify an important and overlooked dimension in his
work, the examination of Holmes’s Romantic psychology actually
does more to draw out the conflict in his thought than to synthesize
his ideas within a single philosophical framework. The point of this
study is to show how the presence of Romantic ideas in Holmes’s
work reflected his struggle to develop a satisfying empirical approach
to law that also accounted for the depth and complexity of human
nature. Holmes remained openly skeptical regarding the ability of
empirical science, and more importantly law, to comprehend the
“unfathomable” meaning of man’s inner life and its relationship to
the universe.39 In the end, he rebelled against what he called the
“insufficiency of facts”:40 the inability of empirical science to explain
fully the unconscious depths, passionate drives and imaginative
impulses in human nature.
Given the current enthusiasm for behaviorist and quantitative
theories of human nature, Holmes’s appreciation for the mysteries of
the human mind may seem somewhat outdated and naive, or even,
given his tough-minded reputation, sentimental. Yet it is likely that
Holmes remains a living figure in the law today in part because he
wrote with forceful eloquence about the dynamic complexities of
human nature, including his own. Holmes recognized that individuals
do not always behave in rational and transparent ways,41 and that law
must come to terms, in whatever ways possible, with the existence of
unconscious forces lying beneath the surface of rational awareness.
The Romantic vision in Holmes’s work brought psychological depth
to his empirical outlook by challenging the illusion of the rational,
transparent self, an illusion that still prevails, after more than a
century, in law and legal philosophy.
39. See The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 478, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS,
supra note 3, at 406.
40. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to William James (Dec. 15, 1867), quoted in
PERRY, supra note 1, at 89, 90 (emphasis added).
41. For a recent philosophical exploration of this point, see JONATHAN LEAR, OPEN
MINDED: WORKING OUT THE LOGIC OF THE SOUL (1998).
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I. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HOLMES’S JURISPRUDENTIAL WRITINGS
With the publication of The Common Law in 1881, just months
before his fortieth birthday, Holmes brilliantly realized his youthful
aspiration of bringing speculative thought to bear on American law.
Yet over a century later the nature of Holmes’s philosophical
endeavor still remains open to dispute.42 Missing altogether from the
debate over Holmes’s philosophical outlook is an understanding of
the importance of psychological ideas to his thinking about the
common law. While Holmes’s contribution as an historian,
philosopher and social scientist to the study of law is well-recognized,
what is less well-understood is the extent to which Holmes was also a
student of psychology. Holmes devoted the entire first chapter of The
Common Law to the proposition that all liability is rooted in the
human instinct for revenge, and the theme remains dominant
throughout the rest of the book.43 The theme of revenge serves to
introduce the richly introspective psychology that permeated
Holmes’s late-nineteenth-century jurisprudential writings.
The psychological ideas central to Holmes’s legal thought refute
the prevailing view of Holmes as a behaviorist or other strictly
empirical observer of human nature. Holmes developed a view of
human nature centered around two basic Romantic concepts:
instinctual drives and unconscious motivations. This Part explores the
significance of these psychological concepts in his two most
important jurisprudential works, The Common Law and The Path of
the Law. Holmes believed that legal decisionmakers should limit the
role of unconscious factors in the development of law; he was also
clear that law must take account of the reality of unconscious drives
in human behavior. His belief in external standards—that common
law liability should turn on the consequences of external behavior
42. Many scholars now characterize Holmes’s particular blend of historicist and
instrumentalist views as “neo-pragmatist.” Grey, supra note 31, at 789; see also Robert W.
Gordon, Introduction to THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., supra note 8, at 9
(opining that Grey “convincingly reconciled” “Holmes’s positivist-formalist-conceptualist
projects” with his historicism “through imputing to Holmes a pragmatic motive”); Catharine
Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition: The Pragmatism of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 NW. U. L. REV. 541 (1988) (linking Holmes to the nineteenth-century
pragmatism of Charles Peirce and William James). But see H.L. POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES AND UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE 163-64 (1984) (discussing the “weak”
link between Holmes and pragmatism); Patrick J. Kelley, Was Holmes a Pragmatist?
Reflections on a New Twist to an Old Argument, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 427 (1990) (arguing against
Grey’s classification of Holmes as a pragmatist and instead linking Holmes with the positivists).
43. See THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 5.
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rather than on subjective intent—may be the most well-known
example of his deep-seated concern with the unknowability of human
motivation.
A. Instincts and Evolution
It certainly may be argued, with some force, that it has never ceased
to be one object of punishment to satisfy the desire for vengeance.44
As already noted, Holmes began his “rational study” of the
common law by positing revenge as the principal motivating force
behind the development of legal liability. “My aim and purpose,” he
explained, “have been to show that the various forms of liability
known to modern law spring from the common ground of revenge.”45
By focusing on revenge, Holmes was pursuing a theme already
popular in nineteenth-century legal literature.46 Many scholars of the
period addressed their attention to revenge when discussing the
retributive aspect of criminal punishment.47 Yet Holmes’s interest in
revenge went well beyond the standard nineteenth century debate
over criminal punishment. He postulated the psychological need for
revenge as the primary cause for the development of all forms of
legal liability. “It is commonly known,” Holmes declared in the first
lecture of The Common Law, “that the early forms of legal
procedure were grounded in vengeance.”48 He inferred the existence
of the revenge motive from the materials of law, anthropology and
history, as well as from his own intuition about why individuals act as
they do.
By tracing the origins of legal liability to the instinctual need for
revenge, Holmes underscored the importance of understanding legal
rules by reference to their historical development. Historical analysis,
Holmes explained, would reveal the public policy considerations—
44. Id. at 40.
45. Id. at 37.
46. See PETER GAY, THE CULTIVATION OF HATRED 133-41 (1993).
47. See THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 14 (citing CLAUDE-JOSEPH TISSOT, 2 LE
DROIT PENAL: ETUDIE DANS SES PRINCIPES, DANS LES USAGES ET LES LOIS DES DIVERS
PEUPLES DU MONDE, 615 (1860)); id. at 41, 51, 73 (citing JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A
GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1865)). Thinkers as “opposed” as
Bishop Butler and Jeremy Bentham, Holmes noted, argued “not only that the law does, but
that it ought to, make the gratification of revenge an object [of the criminal law].” Id. at 41.
48. Id. at 2.
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such as the gratification of revenge—that underlie all legal rules.
“[History] is a part of the rational study [of law],” he asserted,
“because it is the first step toward an enlightened scepticism, that is,
towards a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of those rules.”49
However pessimistic Holmes may have been at times about the
possibility of raising the human condition and, as we shall see,
however Romantic he may have been in his assessment of human
nature, he was vigorously optimistic about the prospect for improving
the system of law. His historical methodology fused with a scientific
zeal for reforming what he referred to as “one of the vastest products
of the human mind.”50 History was the method by which the
parameters and justifications for legal rules would be opened up for
conscious revision by decisionmakers informed by the study of other
disciplines,51 including, we might infer, psychology.52
Thus it was that Holmes began the first lecture of The Common
Law with a comprehensive history of revenge in the early law. As he
explained, the individual’s instinct for revenge originally manifested
itself in violent self-help,53 but eventually evolved into a system of
legal rules aimed at punishing blameworthy actors. He drew a direct
connection between the instinct for revenge and early subjective
49. The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 469, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 3, at 399; see also Law in Science, supra note 33, at 452, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED
WORKS, supra note 3, at 412 (“History sets us free and enables us to make up our minds
dispassionately whether the survival which we are enforcing answers any new purpose when it
has ceased to answer the old.”). Holmes hoped that the need for historical analysis, so pressing
at that moment, would eventually diminish. “I look forward to a time when the part played by
history in the explanation of dogma shall be very small, and instead of ingenious research we
shall spend our energy on a study of the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring
them.” The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 474, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 3, at 402-03.
50. The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 473, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 3, at 402.
51. See, e.g., THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 37 (mentioning anthropology); id. at 1
(discussing history and theories of legislation); The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 469,
reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 399 (discussing history, economics, and
statistics); id. at 474, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 403 (discussing
jurisprudence).
52. See infra note 91 and accompanying text (quoting The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at
477, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 404-05). It should not come as a
surprise that Holmes did not refer explicitly to psychology: psychology as an independent
discipline was in its infancy, and many, perhaps including Holmes himself, would still have
considered psychology a branch of philosophy. See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
53. See THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 161 (“[I]n the main the law started from those
intentional wrongs which are the simplest and most pronounced cases, as well as the nearest to
the feeling of revenge which leads to self-redress.”).
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standards of moral wrongdoing.54 Subjective standards of liability
satisfied the instinct for revenge because they derived “from a moral
basis, from the thought that some one was to blame.”55 Holmes
described how personal trespass “started from the notion of actual
intent and actual personal culpability”56 and how third-party liability
“also had its root in the passion of revenge.”57 With most of the first
lecture devoted to showing how the liability of inanimate objects fit
within his revenge theory, Holmes addressed the situation of “a tree
which falls upon a man, or from which he falls and is killed.”58 In
“primitive” times, the tree itself might have been delivered up to the
suffering relatives “or chopped to pieces for the gratification of a real
or simulated passion.”59 Animism thus explained how liability for
harm caused by animals and inanimate objects fell within Holmes’s
theory that revenge was the universal source of legal liability.60
The human need for vengeance produced an early legal system
that focused, said Holmes, on “the actual internal state of the
individual’s mind.”61 As the common law evolved, however, moral
standards were eventually replaced by objective rules aimed at
controlling socially harmful behavior rather than punishing bad
motivations. Drawing upon “materials for anthropology,”62 Holmes
insisted that existing moral standards in law were mere “survivals”63
54. “Vengeance imports a feeling of blame, and an opinion, however distorted by passion,
that a wrong has been done. It can hardly go very far beyond the case of a harm intentionally
inflicted: even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.” Id. at 3.
55. Id. at 37.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id. at 11.
59. Id.; see also id. at 8 (“If a beast killed a man, it was to be slain and cast beyond the
borders. If an inanimate thing caused death, it was to be cast beyond the borders in like
manner, and expiation was to be made.”).
60. See id. at 37; id. at 10-11:
[I]t may be asked how inanimate objects came to be pursued in this way, if the object
of the procedure was to gratify the passion of revenge. Learned men have been
ready to find a reason in the personification of inanimate nature common to savages
and children, and there is much to confirm this view.
61. The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 463, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 3, at 395.
62. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 37.
63. Id. (“[I]n large and important branches of the law the various grounds of policy on
which the various rules have been justified are later inventions to account for what are in fact
survivals from more primitive times . . . .“); see also id. at 5 (“The customs, beliefs, or needs of a
primitive time establish a rule or formula. In the course of centuries the custom, belief, or
necessity disappears, but the rule remains.”).
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from that earlier period when the “forms of legal procedure were
grounded in vengeance.”64 Subjective standards, such as “malice” and
mens rea, he argued, actually turned on external behavior and not
bad intent.65 Moral views were embedded in the social policies
justifying legal rules,66 he agreed, but individual moral culpability had
been eliminated as a basis for imposing legal liability.67 “[W]hile the
law does still and always, in a certain sense, measure legal liability by
moral standards, it nevertheless, by the very necessity of its nature, is
continually transmuting those moral standards into external or
objective ones, from which the actual guilt of the party concerned is
wholly eliminated.”68 Holmes devoted the remainder of The Common
Law to detailing how a primitive concern with punishing moral
blameworthiness had evolved into a modern regime “wholly
indifferent to the internal phenomena of conscience.”69
The evolution Holmes charted—from violent self-help, to
subjective standards of intentional wrongdoing, to external standards
of behavior—reflected his historicist approach to understanding
modern legal rules. Yet Holmes made clear that the evolution from
subjective to external standards did not come about as a result of a
corresponding reduction in the instinct for revenge. Legal standards
had evolved over time, but what had not changed was the human
instinct for vengeance. We may assume, Holmes commented at the
beginning of The Common Law, “that the earliest barbarian whose
practices are to be considered, had a good many of the same feelings
and passions as ourselves.”70 In describing the primitive law of
surrender, under which the offending animal or slave was given over
to the injured party, Holmes noted that “[t]he desire for vengeance
may be felt as strongly against a slave as against a freeman, and it is
not without example nowadays that a like passion should be felt
64. Id. at 2.
65. See, e.g., id. at 76 (arguing that malice and intent are criminal elements because they
increase the likelihood that an act will cause harm).
66. See The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 459, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS,
supra note 3, at 392 (“The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life.”).
67. The only morality remaining in modern law, according to Holmes, attached to the
prevailing standard of reasonableness: “The reference to the prudent man, as a standard, is the
only form in which blameworthiness as such is an element of crime, and what would be
blameworthy in such a man is an element . . . .” THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 76.
68. Id. at 38.
69. Id. at 110.
70. Id. at 2.
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against an animal.”71 Particularly in cases where monetary
compensation is not available, one of the objects of punishing
criminal offenders “is to gratify the desire for vengeance.”72 In these
cases, “[t]he prisoner pays with his body.”73 Primitive self-help had
evolved into the more “civilized” form of monetary compensation,
but the underlying human need remained the same.74
Taken by itself, Holmes’s psychology of revenge might seem
strangely at odds with his more general historical and empirical
views, and at least one commentator has directly accused Holmes of
relying on a reductionist and ahistorical psychology.75 It is certainly
true that Holmes’s theory of revenge emphasized a view of what is
instinctual, universal and historically constant about human nature.
Yet as Freud’s work would later vividly illustrate, there is nothing
inherently reductionist about recognizing the importance of
instinctual drives in human affairs.76 To acknowledge that some
human feelings and desires—in particular, sexuality and aggression,
and perhaps also the urge for self-preservation77—are constant
features of the human condition hardly qualifies as a simplistic or
grossly materialist view of man. One might with some justification
71. Id. at 15.
72. Id. at 41.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 40 (questioning whether the desire for revenge “is still accepted either in this
primitive form, or in some more refined development”).
75. See Robert W. Gordon, Holmes’ Common Law as Legal and Social Science, 10
HOFSTRA L. REV. 719, 730-31 (1982).
76. See SIGMUND FREUD, Instincts and Their Vicissitudes (1915), in 14 THE STANDARD
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 117 (James
Strachey ed. & trans., 1957) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE WORKS OF FREUD]. The existence of
human instincts, moreover, is itself a complex psychological phenomenon that cannot be
equated with simple biological urges. See id. at 118-20. As Freud explained, except perhaps in
situations of extreme physical deprivation or reflexive physical response, human instincts
operate on the boundary between somatic functions and psychic experience:
If now we apply ourselves to considering mental life from a biological point of view,
an ‘instinct’ appears to us as a concept on the frontier between the mental and the
somatic, as the psychical representative of the stimuli originating from within the
organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind
for work in consequence of its connection with the body.
Id. at 121-22 (citations omitted); see also Hans W. Loewald, On Motivation and Instinct Theory,
in PAPERS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 102, 119 (1980) (arguing that instincts are “constituent of the
stream of mental life, and not a biological stimulus operating upon that stream”).
77. Holmes also identified the instinct for possession. See THE COMMON LAW, supra note
6, at 213. In contrast, Freud focused on two basic drives—libido and aggression. See SIGMUND
FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID 30 (James Strachey ed. & Joan Riviere trans., W.W. Norton &
Co. 1960) (1923).
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criticize Holmes’s idea that all forms of legal liability can be traced
back to the instinct for revenge on the ground that it presents an
overly simplistic account of the origins of law, but his belief in
revenge and its important role in shaping human affairs is not
manifestly deficient. When taken with the rest of his ideas about
human nature, his theory of revenge constitutes one piece of a rich
and comprehensive psychological understanding of human behavior
and feeling.
Holmes did not identify what he believed to be the biological
source of the desire for revenge, and it is difficult to conjecture what
biological need the revenge motive would serve.78 Given his fondness
for Darwinian ideas,79 Holmes may have thought that the drive for
self-preservation played a role in stimulating the impulse for revenge,
although his references to revenge as a “passion” suggest that he
understood the often irrational and self-destructive aspects of this
instinctual response;80 a biological drive toward aggression seems a
better candidate. In any event, revenge, as used by Holmes, was not
merely a biological stimulus but also a fundamental motivational
force shaping individual and social behavior.
Revenge is the most prominent of the instincts discussed in The
Common Law, but Holmes did consider three other instincts as
relevant to the study of law: the sexual instinct,81 the instinct for self-
preservation,82 and the instinct for possession.83 When discussing legal
possession, for example, Holmes observed that “man, by an instinct
which he shares with the domestic dog, and of which the seal gives a
most striking example, will not allow himself to be dispossessed,
78. See Charles Brenner, Psychoanalysis: Classical Theory, in 13 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1, 4 (David L. Sills ed., 1990) (“[T]he somatic
sources, if any, of aggression (the aggressive drive) are less clear than those of the erotic
drive.”).
79. See PHILIP P. WIENER, EVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDERS OF PRAGMATISM 172-89
(1949).
80. Revenge may be understood in purely biological terms as a somatic stimulus to
survival—a physical response to harm that serves to protect the individual against future
aggressions—but revenge could also be viewed in many situations as an irrational passion
antithetical to survival.
81. See THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 41; see also infra note 86 and accompanying
text.
82. See id. at 44 (“If a man is on a plank in the deep sea which will only float one, and a
stranger lays hold of it, he will thrust him off if he can.”).
83. See The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 477, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS,
supra note 3, at 405 (“A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own . . . takes root in
your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act . . . .”).
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either by force or fraud, of what he holds, without trying to get it
back again.”84 Instinctual behavior is in part what connects man to the
animal world, but the mastery of instinctual needs is also what sets
man apart. In this important respect, Holmes recognized the fixity of
instinctual needs while at the same time recognizing the plasticity of
their social expression and gratification. The instinct that once drove
men to violent retaliation is now typically gratified through criminal
punishment.85 In a similar vein, Holmes quoted Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen, an essayist, judge and close friend, for the idea that “the
criminal law stands to the passion of revenge in much the same
relation as marriage to the sexual appetite.”86 The sexual instinct,
expressed psychologically as romantic and erotic love, is gratified
through the laws of marriage; the instinct of revenge is gratified
through criminal punishment; and the instinct of self-protection is
gratified though protection of property. Holmes appeared to view the
development of law in large part as an evolving mechanism for the
satisfaction—and control—of these instinctual needs.
Thus Holmes saw that the task of mastering human instincts had
been given to law, and rightly so in his view. He concluded that any
viable system of justice must be deliberately designed with this end in
mind:
The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should corre-
spond with the actual feelings and demands of the community,
whether right or wrong. If people would gratify the passion of re-
venge outside of the law, if the law did not help them, the law has no
choice but to satisfy the craving itself, and thus avoid the greater evil
of private retribution.87
Legal rules must accommodate the instinctual needs of human
nature as a matter of good, even necessary, public policy. Thus, while
84. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 213.
85. See id. at 41-42.
86. STEPHEN, supra note 47, at 99, quoted in THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 41.
Holmes may have discovered Stephen’s observation by reading Alexander Bain. See
ALEXANDER BAIN, MENTAL SCIENCE; A COMPENDIUM OF PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE HISTORY
OF PHILOSOPHY 267 n.* (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1868) [hereinafter BAIN, MENTAL
SCIENCE].
87. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 41-42; see also id. at 213 (“As long as the instinct
remains, it will be more comfortable for the law to satisfy it in an orderly manner, than to leave
people to themselves.”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Possession, 12 AM. L. REV. 688, 719
(1878). There is a difference between mastering and satisfying instincts. In this passage, Holmes
seemed to focus on satisfying instinctual needs, while at other times he suggests the importance
of mastering them.
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Holmes believed that the rational study of law should be carried out
by “the man of statistics and the master of economics,”88 he also
made clear that “an understanding of economics” was not the only
way “to get to the bottom of the subject” of law.89 Holmes highlighted
economics as an important branch of the growing social sciences, but
he never slighted the importance of psychological knowledge: 90
Sir Henry Maine has made it fashionable to connect the archaic
notion of property with prescription. But the connection is further
back than the first recorded history. It is in the nature of man’s mind.
A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long
time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and
cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to
defend yourself, however you came by it. The law can ask no better
justification than the deepest instincts of man.91
While Holmes believed that society may subordinate individual
needs, and even individual lives, to social welfare,92 he concluded that
the desirable social policy regarding the instinct of revenge was to
satisfy it.93 Otherwise, he suggested, social order would be threatened
as the passion for vengeance would lead individuals to resort to
violent self-help.94 Holmes did qualify his views by noting that “this
passion is not one which we encourage, either as private individuals
or as law-makers.”95 Nevertheless, good law reform for Holmes
meant that the innate psychological needs of human beings must be
taken into account in designing a practical and effective system of
legal rules.
88. The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 469, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 3, at 399.
89. Id. at 476, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 404.
90. See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING
YEARS: 1870–1882, at 280 (1963) [hereinafter HOWE, PROVING YEARS].
91. The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 477, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 3, at 404-05 (emphasis added).
92. See THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 43 (“No society has ever admitted that it
could not sacrifice individual welfare to its own existence.”).
93. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
94. Cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918),
reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 180, 181 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992) (“Deep-seated
preferences can not be argued about . . . and therefore, when differences are sufficiently far
reaching, we try to kill the other man rather than let him have his way.”).
95. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 42.
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B. Unconscious Ideas and Legal Rules
Behind the logical form [of law] lies a judgment as to the relative
worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an
inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very
root and nerve of the whole proceeding.96
In Holmes’s view, the most harmful characteristic of the legal
system and, consequently, that most in need of reform, was the
influence of unconscious factors on legal decisionmaking. Legislators
and judges, Holmes believed, were “largely unconscious” of the
subjective process by which they developed legal rules.97
Every important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact
and at bottom the result of more or less definitely understood views
of public policy; most generally, to be sure, under our practice and
traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inar-
ticulate convictions, but none the less traceable to views of public
policy in the last analysis.98
Once these unconscious motivations—the hidden public policy
justifications, as Holmes called them—were revealed, legal
decisionmakers would then be in a position to decide whether to
reject or revise particular legal rules. Historical study, then, would
allow the influence of unconscious factors on law to be replaced by
the conscious, rational consideration of social aims. Instrumental
reason would prevail over passion and instinct, the legal analogue to
Freud’s famous maxim: “Where id was, there ego shall be.”99
The idea of the unconscious was thus central to Holmes’s theory
of legal decisionmaking. His use of the concept, moreover, clearly
96. The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 466, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 3, at 397.
97. Holmes wrote:
[H]itherto this process [of legal evolution] has been largely unconscious. It is impor-
tant, on that account, to bring to mind what the actual course of events has been. If it
were only to insist on a more conscious recognition of the legislative function of the
courts . . . it would be useful . . . .
THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 36; see also The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 467-68,
reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 397-98 (maintaining that lawmakers are
often unconscious of the extent to which various factors influence their decisions); cf. Law in
Science, supra note 33, at 452, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 411-12
(tracing the “evolutionary process” of the law of torts).
98. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 35-36 (emphasis added).
99. SIGMUND FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 112
(W.J.H. Sprott trans., 1933).
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meant more than simply “hidden” or “implicit” in the common sense
of the term. Holmes also used “unconscious” to describe the process
of legal decisionmaking; judges, lawyers and legislators were
unconscious of the true grounds for their own decisions. The grounds
were hidden, but also, Holmes implied, the decisionmakers were
unaware. Judges had a duty to search out the underlying motivations
for their legal decisions:
I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recog-
nize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage. The
duty is inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed judicial
aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to leave the very
ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often uncon-
scious, as I have said.100
To the extent he saw legal decisionmakers as having the respon-
sibility to search out the true grounds for legal rules, his vision of
legal reform drew on an ideal of judicial self-awareness. The rational
study of law would come to be carried out in part by historical
analysis and in part by personal self-reflection; judges were not to be
content with the traditional justifications for legal rules, but were to
search for the deeper reasons influencing their decisions.101
While Holmes may have been the first legal thinker to utilize the
idea of the unconscious, by the late nineteenth century the concept
itself was nothing new.102 The meaning of the term tended to vary
depending on the perspective of the thinker, but all conceptions of
the unconscious from the period shared the notion of ideas or
psychological processes not present in immediate awareness. This
core meaning of the term can be traced back to the work of the
seventeenth-century German philosopher Leibniz, the first to address
explicitly the notion of the unconscious.103 Leibniz conceived of
100. The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 467, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 3, at 398.
101. See Law in Science, supra note 33, at 455, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 3, at 415. This is perhaps why, in Holmes’s view, judicial reliance upon simple
catchphrases such as “taking the risk,” and “invitation and trap,” had its pitfalls. “It is . . . the
tiresome repetition of inadequate catch words upon which I am observing,—phrases . . . which,
by their very felicity, delay further analysis for fifty years.” Id.
102. See HENRI F. ELLENBERGER, THE DISCOVERY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS 311-12 (1970);
EDUARD VON HARTMANN, PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS (William Chatterton
Coupland trans., Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1931) (1868).
103. See R.S. Peters & C.A. Mace, Psychology, in 7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
1, 11 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) (noting that Leibniz “prepared the ground for the concept of
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mental life as comprised of infinitesimal units of force, called
monads, which exhibited both material and spiritual properties and
which existed on a continuum from perception (unconscious) to
apperception (consciousness).104 Johann Herbart, an early
experimental psychologist,105 expanded upon Leibniz’s idea of the
unconscious by developing a more dynamic theory of inhibited ideas:
those ideas which reside in the unconscious and which may pass the
“limen of consciousness” into full awareness.106 By the “limen of
consciousness,” Herbart meant the border that an idea crossed in
moving from a state of inhibition into a state of conscious
awareness.107 The basic notion of unconscious inference was also an
integral part of the physiological psychology pioneered by German
physiologists in the mid-nineteenth century.108
In addition to this core meaning of ideas not present in con-
sciousness, the term “unconscious” also carried in Holmes’s work, as
it did in Herbart’s, a rudimentary dynamic aspect. To begin with,
Holmes clearly conceived of the unconscious as the seat of powerful
instinctual emotions. He captured this aspect of the unconscious in
his famous metaphor of the dark cave: he likened unconscious
motivations to a dragon which, once dragged from his dark cave into
the light of consciousness, can be killed or tamed, but while hidden in
                                                                                                                                     
unconscious mental processes which was to prove so important in nineteenth century
thought”).
104. See EDWIN G. BORING, A HISTORY OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 168 (2d ed.
1950).
105. See BORING, supra note 104, at 250; ELLENBERGER, supra note 102, at 312.
106. See BORING, supra note 104, at 256-57 (discussing Herbart’s Lehrbuch zur
Psychologie); see also J.A.C. BROWN, FREUD AND THE POST-FREUDIANS 18 (1961) (“The
concept of the unconscious plays an important part in the works of the psychologist Herbart, . .
. in the writings of Carl Gustav Carus, . . . [and] in Eduard von Hartmann’s Philosophy of the
Unconscious—not to mention the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Spinoza.”).
107. See BORING, supra note 104, at 256. Herbart’s dynamic theory clearly foreshadowed
Freud’s concept of repression.
108. See id. at 308-11. In the 1860s, Helmholtz explained unconscious inference as follows:
The psychic activities, by which we arrive at the judgment that a certain object of
a certain character exists before us at a certain place, are generally not conscious
activities but unconscious ones. In their results they are equivalent to an inference, in
so far as we achieve, by way of the observed effect upon our senses, the idea of the
cause of this effect, even though in fact it is invariably only the nervous excitations,
the effects, that we can perceive directly, and never the external objects. Neverthe-
less, they thus appear to be differentiated from an inference, in the ordinary sense of
this word, in that an inference is an act of conscious thinking.
BORING, supra note 104, at 309 (quoting and translating HERMANN VON HELMHOLTZ,
HANDBUCH DER PHYSIOLOGISCHEN OPTIK (1866)).
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the cave remains a savage, fantastical force in human nature.109 That
he viewed the unconscious as the realm of innate passions is evident
from the general portrait of human nature that emerges from his
writings, one in which individuals are governed in significant ways by
“feelings and passions” beyond their rational control.110 Vengeance,
possession, self-preservation, and sexual desire were elemental
passions exerting their tremendous influence over the actions of men
and women. “Primitive” men and children were particularly ruled by
unconscious impulses,111 but so, as Holmes put it, were “full-grown
civilized Europeans.”112 Quoting George Grote, Holmes described
how “the force of momentary passion will often suffice to supersede
the acquired habit, and even an intelligent man may be impelled in a
moment of agonizing pain to kick or beat the lifeless object from
which he has suffered.”113 Holmes’s writing is full of passages
depicting man at his most emotionally elemental: thrusting the
stranger off the plank in the deep sea,114 filled with the rage of
revenge,115 stubbornly holding onto acquired possessions,116 and
ravishing virtuous women.117 Like man’s innate passion for
vengeance, Holmes saw the egoistic drive as unrelenting in its raw
brutishness.118 Holmes’s idea of the unconscious seemed to present
109. See The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 469, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS,
supra note 3, at 399:
When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight, you can
count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength. But to get him out is only
the first step. The next is either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful
animal.
110. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 2.
111. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Primitive Notions in Modern Law, 10 AM. L. REV.
422, 429 (1876), reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 3, 9 (arguing that “the
savage mind well represents the childish stage”).
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting George Grote without identifying original source).
114. See THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 44.
115. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
116. See The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 477, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS,
supra note 3, at 405.
117. See Law in Science, supra note 33, at 453, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 3, at 413. Holmes here is refreshingly sensitive to many women’s reluctance to report rape,
although he does use the term “virtuous” in the Victorian manner. His view of women here is
interesting to contrast with the view he expressed in the opinion of the Court in Buck v. Bell,
274 U.S. 200 (1927), a decision upholding the forced sterilization of a retarded woman: “Three
generations of imbeciles are enough.” Id. at 207.
118. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Lewis Einstein (May 21, 1914), in
THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS 93 (J.B. Peabody ed., 1964):
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aggression and egoism as important, if not the principal, motivating
forces in human nature.
The meaning of “unconscious” as emotions or ideas influencing
behavior but not subject to direct knowledge or observation was
present in the work of many philosophers and writers known to
Holmes, including his own father.119 Among the most important
writers who promoted this idea of the unconscious, and who were
read by Holmes in the years leading up to the publication of The
Common Law, were Plato, Kant, Carlyle, Coleridge, Emerson,
Hegel, Spinoza, and Henry and William James.120 Emerson, for
example, a close friend of Holmes’s father, had described the
unconscious in overtly theological terms: “The world proceeds from
the same spirit as the body of man. It is a remoter and inferior
incarnation of God, a projection of God in the unconscious.”121 Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Sr., a widely-known physician and writer, also
believed that “[u]nconscious activity is the rule with the actions most
important to life.”122 Present in the work of all these writers was a
                                                                                                                                     
Disgust is ultimate and therefore as irrational as reason itself—a dogmatic datum.
The world has produced the rattlesnake as well as me; but I kill it if I get a chance, as
also mosquitos, cockroaches, murderers, and flies. My only judgment is that they are
incongruous with the world I want; the kind of world we all try to make according to
our power.
119. C.P. OBERNDORF, A HISTORY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN AMERICA 31 (1953). Peter
Gay writes that, “by the Age of the Enlightenment, some perceptive students of human nature
had recognized the existence of unconscious mentation,” including Lichtenberg, Goethe,
Schiller, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. PETER GAY, FREUD: A LIFE FOR OUR TIME 127-28
(1988) [hereinafter GAY, FREUD].
120. See Little, supra note 12, at 174-90; Hoffheimer, supra note 31, at 1224-26.
121. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Spirit, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF RALPH
WALDO EMERSON 167 (London, Bell & Daldy 1866) (emphasis added).
122. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Mechanism in Thought and Morals, An Address
Delivered Before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Harvard University (June 29, 1870), in PAGES
FROM AN OLD VOLUME OF LIFE 260, 277 (5th ed. 1883). The elder Holmes described a process
almost identical to Freud’s theory of the unconscious and free association:
The more we examine the mechanism of thought, the more we shall see that the
automatic, unconscious action of the mind enters largely into all its processes. Our
definite ideas are stepping stones; how we get from one to the other, we do not know;
something carries us; we do not take the step.
Id. at 284-85. For Holmes’s father’s views on the unconscious, see THE PSYCHIATRIC NOVELS
OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (Clarence P. Oberndorf ed., 1943). Unlike his father, Holmes
did not view the unconscious as a manifestation of a higher order:
I believe that we are in the universe, not it in us, that we are part of an unimaginable,
which I will call a whole, in order to name it, that our personality is a cosmic gan-
glion, that just as when certain rays meet and cross there is white light at the meeting
point, but the rays go on after the meeting as they did before, so, when certain other
streams of energy cross, the meeting point can frame a syllogism or wag its tail. I
never forget that the cosmos has the power to produce consciousness, intelligence,
ideals, out of a like course of its energy, but I see no reason to assume that these
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dynamic conception of unconscious ideas and motivations influencing
human behavior in unknown ways.
Holmes emphasized the direct influence of the unconscious on
legal decisionmakers, but his conception of the unconscious was
relevant to his ideas about legal doctrine as well. Holmes’s
enthusiasm for external standards of liability may in part have been
driven by his appreciation for the role of unconscious motivation in
human affairs.123 It is possible that Holmes was willing to sacrifice
subjective culpability because actual motivation was not readily
accessible to conscious perception. Subjective intent was driven by
unconscious passions and impulsive emotional reactions that
obviously did not lend themselves to the “quantitative” measurement
Holmes aspired to in law. In The Common Law, Holmes raised this
problem of subjective motivation:
The standards of the law are standards of general application.
The law takes no account of the infinite varieties of temperament,
intellect, and education which make the internal character of a given
act so different in different men. It does not attempt to see men as
God sees them, for more than one sufficient reason. In the first
place, the impossibility of nicely measuring a man’s powers and limi-
tations is far clearer than that of ascertaining his knowledge of law . .
. . 124
                                                                                                                                     
ultimates for me are cosmic ultimates. I frame no predicates about the cosmos. I
suspect that all my ultimates have the mark of the finite upon them, but as they are
the best I know I give them practical respect, love, etc., but inwardly doubt whether
they have any importance except for us and as something that with or without rea-
sons the universe has produced and therefore for the moment has sanctioned. We
must be serious in order to get work done, but when the usual Saturday half holiday
comes I see no reason why we should not smile at the trick by which nature keeps us
at our job.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Dr. John C.H. Wu (May 5, 1926), in JUSTICE
HOLMES TO DR. WU: AN INTIMATE CORRESPONDENCE, 1921–1932, at 35-36 (n.d.) [hereinafter
JUSTICE HOLMES TO DR. WU] (reprinting letters originally published in T’IEN HSIA MONTHLY,
Oct. 1935, with the permission of John G. Palfrey, executor of the Holmes estate); see also
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to William James (Mar. 24, 1907), quoted in PERRY,
supra note 1, at 301 (“It seems to me that the only promising activity is to make my universe
coherent and livable, not to babble about the universe . . . .”). As explained later in this Article,
Holmes’s views mirrored the Romantic emphasis on the individual’s subjective experience of
transcendent ecstasy and despair. See infra notes 332-46 and accompanying text.
123. See THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 110:
Notwithstanding the fact that the grounds of legal liability are moral to the extent
above explained, it must be borne in mind that law only works within the sphere of
the senses. If the external phenomena, the manifest acts and omissions, are such as it
requires, it is wholly indifferent to the internal phenomena of conscience.
124. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 108 (emphasis added).
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On its face, this passage suggests that Holmes viewed the prob-
lem with subjective standards as, in part, one of proof.125 He raised
this same evidentiary concern in another passage in The Common
Law having to do with the law of trespass, in which he noted that
“the defendant’s knowledge or ignorance of the plaintiff’s title is
likely to lie wholly in his own breast, and therefore hardly admits of
satisfactory proof.”126 While the problem of legal proof certainly
concerned Holmes, his skepticism regarding the ascertainment of
subjective intent likely ran much deeper. The concern was not only
that subjective motivations might be intentionally concealed from
legal decisionmakers, but that they might be unknown even to the
individual actor. Because these subjective motivations cannot be
known directly—because human behavior often turns on unconscious
intentions—legal liability must limit itself to knowable behavior.
Ironically, the most compelling justification for external standards
likely rests on Holmes’s deep appreciation for the internal realm of
unconscious motivations and desires.127
Holmes’s insistence on a legal standard “wholly indifferent to
the internal phenomena of conscience”128 thus did not rule out the
importance of ideas like revenge and the unconscious to the study of
law. Because it imposes liability for harmful behavior rather than for
bad intent, the external standard mistakenly has been taken to reflect
a positivist bias in Holmes’s legal thinking.129 This positivist view has
125. See POHLMAN, supra note 42, at 16.
126. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 87, 99. Holmes noted that centuries earlier it had
been established that a “defendant’s state of mind ‘cannot be construed.’” Id. at 107 (quoting
Y.B. 21 Hen. 7, pl. 5 (1506)).
127. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Trespass and Negligence, 14 AM. L. REV. 1, 21 (1880),
reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 76, 90. While there is no direct evidence
apart from the cited passages that Holmes based his external standard on a theory of the
unconscious, the important point here, as explained in the following pages, is that Holmes’s
belief in the external standard did not necessarily derive from a behaviorist view of human
nature. Indeed, at least early in his career, Freud appears to have shared Holmes’s view that
“judging” should be limited to an examination of external behavior. See SIGMUND FREUD, The
Interpretation of Dreams (1900), reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF FREUD, supra note
76, at 621:
Actions and consciously expressed opinions are as a rule enough for practical pur-
poses in judging men’s characters. Actions deserve to be considered first and fore-
most; for many impulses which force their way through to consciousness are even
then brought to nothing by the real forces of mental life before they can mature into
deeds.
128. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 110.
129. See Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, supra note 31, at 795; Gordon, supra note
75, at 730-31. Limiting the application of legal rules to observable behavior is understood by
some commentators as furthering Holmes’s goal of eliminating moral values from the law.
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been further reinforced by Holmes’s reference to the “bad man, who
cares only for the material consequences” of legal rules.130 Yet any
inconsistency between his introspective psychology and his
behaviorist legal standard disappears once we understand that
Holmes believed that an appreciation of the role of the unconscious
in shaping human behavior was essential to fashioning optimal legal
rules, even while the rules themselves should apply only to external
behavior.
The external standard and the bad man theory helped Holmes to
illustrate his idea “that law only works within the sphere of the
senses”131—his belief that the application of legal rules should be
limited to observable behavior.132 While some commentators have
taken Holmes’s bad man theory as “the signpost which so many have
followed straight down the path to the deadly bog of behaviorism,”133
this view misreads the meaning of Holmes’s rejection of subjective
                                                                                                                                     
Along with his prediction theory of law, see The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 460, reprinted
in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 393 (“The prophecies of what the courts will do in
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”), the external standard is
taken to represent a commitment to “reducing vague and value-laden questions to clear and
factual ones,” Grey, supra note 31, at 795; see also POHLMAN, supra note 42, at 135-36 (arguing
that “the utilitarians adhered to an objective moral standard that reduced morality to a matter
of fact”).
130. “A man may have as bad a heart as he chooses,” Holmes asserted in open defiance of
the analytic philosophers, “if his conduct is within the rules.” THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6,
at 110. More than 130 years before Holmes published his “bad man” theory in the pages of the
Harvard Law Review, Samuel Johnson allegedly took a very similar position in remarking on
Rousseau. As reported by James Boswell, these remarks were as follows:
Boswell. . . . “My dear Sir, you don’t call Rousseau bad company. Do you really think
him a bad man?” Johnson. “Sir, if you are talking jestingly of this, I don’t talk with
you. If you mean to be serious, I think him one of the worst of men; a rascal who
ought to be hunted out of society, as he has been. Three or four nations have ex-
pelled him; and it is a shame that he is protected in this country.” Boswell. “I don’t
deny, Sir, but that his novel may, perhaps, do harm; but I cannot think his intention
was bad.” Johnson. “Sir, that will not do. We cannot prove any man’s intention to be
bad. You may shoot a man through the head, and say you intended to miss him; but
the Judge will order you to be hanged. An alleged want of intention, when evil is
committed, will not be allowed in a court of justice.”
JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON 359 (R. Chapman ed., 1970) (1791) (emphasis added). We
know that Holmes read part of Johnson’s biography in 1874, see Little, supra note 12, at 187,
although there is no direct record of Holmes having read this particular passage. Nevertheless,
it is likely that Holmes, like Johnson, believed that the law should not take subjective intent
into account, and it is also likely that Holmes believed so in part for the same reason Johnson
did: because “[w]e cannot prove any man’s intention to be bad.”
131. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 110.
132. See id. at 307 (“[T]he making of a contract does not depend on the state of the parties’
minds, it depends on their overt acts.”).
133. Henry M. Hart, Jr., Comment, Holmes’ Positivism—An Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV.
929, 932 (1951).
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motivation as a standard for imposing legal liability. Given his
emphasis on the psychological and moral underpinning of legal rules,
the most that can be said about Holmes is that he was a rule
behaviorist. Holmes’s enthusiasm for external standards certainly
reflected his conviction that “[a]ll law is directed to conditions of
things manifest to the senses,”134 but he explicitly recognized the
relevance of psychology to the development of those standards. As
explained earlier,135 psychology, and more broadly morality, were still
vitally relevant “for the purpose of drawing a line between such
bodily motions and rests as [the law] permits, and such as it does
not.”136
The theory of unconscious motivations that most likely led
Holmes in the direction of the external standard of liability also
prompted him to argue that the legal system must in certain
circumstances accommodate these instinctual drives. Man’s capacity
for reason, in Holmes’s view, was always vulnerable to defeat by the
instinctual depths of unconscious life. Law might regulate human
behavior, but it could never fully suppress these potentially
dangerous passions. As he described, “if the law did not [permit
people to gratify the passion for revenge], the law has no choice but
to satisfy the craving itself, and thus avoid the greater evil of private
retribution.”137 In his weighing of the private need for revenge against
the need for social order Holmes elaborated a basic conflict between
unconscious instinctual drives—aggression and egoism in particular—
and the broader needs of the society. Although Holmes was quite
clear that the conflict between individual instincts and social needs
must often end in the sacrifice of the individual,138 he believed that
the opposite was also sometimes true. In Holmes’s view, law must
satisfy at some minimum level the aggressive and egoistic instincts of
man or else lose its claim to authority:
It may be the destiny of man that the social instincts shall grow to
control his actions absolutely, even in anti-social situations. But they
have not yet done so, and as the rules of law are or should be based
upon a morality which is generally accepted, no rule founded on a
134. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 49.
135. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
136. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 110.
137. Id. at 41-42.
138. See, e.g., id. at 43 (“No society has ever admitted that it could not sacrifice individual
welfare to its own existence.”).
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theory of absolute unselfishness can be laid down without a breach
between law and working beliefs.139
Holmes saw the relationship between the innate drives of the
individual and the general welfare of the community as one of
conflict rather than adaptation. Law could thus lay claim to being an
important, if not original, site of reconciliation between inner needs
and external reality.140
Holmes’s ideas about instinctual drives, unconscious feelings,
and conflict reflected his strong interest in the questions being raised
by nineteenth-century psychologists and philosophers. The answers
he gave, however, reflected a greater affinity with the ideas of the
eighteenth-century Romantics than with the empirical approach to
the study of human nature that prevailed in his time. Later in his life,
he would refer back to his early interest in the realm of unconscious
feelings and motivations in a letter to Ethel Scott:
You speak of your reading The Unconscious Mind. As I look on
myself as a cosmic ganglion—a manifestation of the unknown sub-
stratum—that we call energy—or might as well call it X— . . . . I
regard it as somewhat accidental how far the processes of X emerge
into consciousness. When we were both young, before all this later
talk I used the image of a row of bricks (to Wm. James) on two in-
clined planes. [Diagram of bricks in a line, down one plane and up
the other.] You tip the first brick and the row goes down, the first
and the last above the line of consciousness and more may be.141
As we shall see, the unconscious was not the only psychological
concept that Holmes and William James discussed in their early
years, a time when each was struggling to evaluate the usefulness of
empirical science for their respective disciplines. The following Part
examines the way in which Holmes’s view of human nature related
to, but ultimately diverged from, each of the prevailing schools of
late-nineteenth-century empirical psychology.
139. Id. at 44 (discussing these aggressive and egoistic instincts in the historical
development of England); see also The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 477, reprinted in 3
COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 405 (“The law can ask no better justification than the
deepest instincts of man.”).
140. The significance of the point that conflict rather than adaptation defined Holmes’s
relationship between the individual and the social group is discussed in greater detail below.
See infra notes 267-70 and accompanying text.
141. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Ethel Scott (Mar. 9, 1923), quoted in
SHELDON M. NOVICK, THE HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
427 n.8 (1989).
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II. EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS AND THEIR LIMITS
However exceptional his intellectual gifts, Holmes was never-
theless very much a man of his time,142 and his ideas about human
nature were no exception. By all accounts, he came of age during a
time of extraordinary interdisciplinary ferment as philosophy, biology
and physics all converged on the study of the human mind.143
Philosophers had long been preoccupied with epistemological
issues,144 but now, under the ever-widening influence of Newtonian
142. Holmes was born on March 8, 1841, in Boston, the son of Amelia Jackson and Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Sr., the latter a professor of anatomy at the Harvard Medical School and a
well-known poet and writer. Holmes began his studies at Harvard College in 1857, and entered
Harvard Law School in 1864. During the three years before entering law school he fought, and
was nearly killed, in the Civil War. He engaged in the private practice of law in Boston from
1866 until January 1882, when he taught for a short time at Harvard Law School. Holmes was
appointed to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in December 1882 and became Chief
Justice in 1899. Apart from trips to Europe, Holmes continued to live in Boston with his wife
Fanny until his appointment to the United States Supreme court in 1901. See NOVICK, supra
note 141, app. A at 379-82. See generally HOWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 31 (presenting a
biography of Holmes’ education and experiences before his appointment to the Supreme
Court).
143. The historian Peter Gay aptly characterized the nineteenth century as “the
psychological century par excellence.” GAY, FREUD, supra note 119, at 129. See generally
CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 305-90 (1989) (discussing the influence of nature
and naturalism upon the study of mental life).
144. Gary Hatfield notes that “[v]irtually all histories of psychology echo Ebbinghaus’s
remark that psychology has had a ‘brief history’ but a ‘long past.’” GARY HATFIELD, THE
NATURAL AND THE NORMATIVE: THEORIES OF SPATIAL PERCEPTION FROM KANT TO
HELMHOLTZ 8 (1990). The long past refers to the history of the study of the mind within
philosophy—a study that dates as far back as Aristotle—and to the history of the study of the
mind within physiology. See id. at 8 & n.9. Immanuel Kant took the position that psychology
could not be a rational science based on a priori mathematical principles nor an experimental
science based on a posteriori objective methods of observation. See IMMANUEL KANT,
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 25-42 (Norman Kemp Smith trans., Random House, abridged
edition 1958) (1781); see also HATFIELD, supra, at 67-68; David E. Leary, Immanuel Kant and
the Development of Modern Psychology [hereinafter Leary, Kant and Modern Psychology], in
THE PROBLEMATIC SCIENCE: PSYCHOLOGY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY THOUGHT 17, 21-23
(William R. Woodward & Mitchell G. Ash eds., 1982) [hereinafter PROBLEMATIC SCIENCE].
Because the study of the human mind defied quantitative methods and mathematical laws, the
best psychology could hope to be was, in Kant’s view, a “merely empirical” science, that is, a
descriptive science focused on the structure and functioning of the human mind. See
IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL SCIENCE 3-17 (James
Ellington trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1970) (1786); see also PATRICIA KITCHER, KANT’S
TRANSCENDENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 11-14 (1990) (discussing Kant’s view of psychology as a
science); David E. Leary, The Historical Foundation of Herbart’s Mathematization of
Psychology, 16 J. HIST. BEHAV. SCI. 150, 151 (1980) [hereinafter Leary, Herbart’s
Mathematization of Psychology] (describing how, in Kant’s view, “merely empirical”
knowledge—knowledge that is “a posteriori, contingent, or probable”— could not be truly
scientific because “it would be neither certain nor necessary”). Kant’s critique of rational
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physics, the study of mental life had become the province of the
natural sciences as well.145 Holmes, the son of a physician and a
committed intellectual, was bound to be affected by these
contemporary developments, which we know he studied carefully.
This Part examines nineteenth-century empirical psychology to assess
the impact of these intellectual currents on Holmes’s own developing
psychology. By this analysis, I hope not only to expose how these
intellectual forces may have shaped Holmes’s psychological views,
but more importantly to draw out the stark difference between
Holmes’s views and those of his empirical contemporaries. Holmes,
unlike others of his generation, never renounced the psychological
insights of Romanticism.
Any examination of nineteenth-century empirical psychology
must begin with the work of German physiologists, who, in the early
part of the century, turned their attention to the mechanisms by
which the human mind takes in information from the world. Relying
on the empirical methods of observation and induction, these early
                                                                                                                                     
psychology set the stage for the early-nineteenth-century shift away from philosophical
psychology to the empirical science of the mind, despite the fact that Kant reintroduced
rational principles into his empirical psychology, see infra note 155, and, with his principle of
transcendentalism, ultimately reinforced Cartesian dualism within psychology, see BORING,
supra note 104, at 249.
145. See HATFIELD, supra note 144, at 25-26. Beginning in 1860, a veritable explosion of
activity occurred both abroad and in the United States as empirical psychology struggled for
disciplinary independence against its traditional sovereign—philosophy. See William R.
Woodward, Introduction: Stretching the Limits of Psychology’s History [hereinafter Woodward,
Stretching the Limits], in PROBLEMATIC SCIENCE, supra note 144, at 1-3.
Wilhelm Wundt established the first full-fledged experimental laboratory devoted
exclusively to psychological research at the University at Leipzig in 1879, see BORING, supra
note 104, at 323-24; while in the United States, William James had an informal demonstrational
laboratory as early as 1875, see id. at 509, and G. Stanley Hall established the first American
experimental psychological laboratory in 1883, see id. at 520. Alexander Bain published the
first psychological journal, entitled Mind, in England in 1876. See id. at 236. The following year,
G. Stanley Hall founded the American Journal of Psychology, the first such journal in the
United States. See id. at 520.
These years also witnessed the academic institutionalization of psychology as an
independent discipline both in Europe, see R. Steven Turner, Helmholtz, Sensory Physiology,
and the Disciplinary Development of German Psychology, in PROBLEMATIC SCIENCE, supra
note 144, at 148-51 (“In the German university system until the last quarter of the nineteenth
century psychology did not exist as an independent discipline, but rather as a subfield of
general philosophy.”), and in the United States, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF
DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 16 (1973)
(describing how Chicago and Cornell established departments of psychology in 1892). See
generally Mitchell G. Ash, Epilogue: Reflections on Psychology in History, in PROBLEMATIC
SCIENCE, supra note 144, at 359-64. As the discipline developed, professional roles were also
delineated. See Woodward, Stretching the Limits, supra, at 5.
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physiologists saw the experimental study of perception and
sensation—in particular, reflexes, optics and acoustics—as the key to
unlocking the mysteries of the human mind. Although empirical
psychology never completely severed its relationship to philosophy,146
the overall goal was to understand human consciousness in scientific
rather than speculative terms.147 While very few psychologists in the
nineteenth century went so far as to embrace purely materialist
theories of human nature, almost all can be said to have adopted an
empirical approach to the study of the mind.148
Nineteenth-century empirical psychology had three main attrib-
utes that distinguished it from the tradition of philosophical
psychology: first, its methods were experimental rather than
speculative; second, it was a psychology of consciousness as well as
the material brain and nervous system; and third, it was experiential
rather than nativist when it came to the sources of human knowledge
and behavior. The experimental nature of the new psychology
officially began with the establishment in 1879 of Wilhem Wundt’s
laboratory in Leipzig, the first laboratory in the world devoted
exclusively to psychological research.149 Wundt and his colleagues
adapted the experimental methods developed for the natural
sciences, which included observation and hypothesis, to the study of
consciousness, perception and movement. Yet while the methods of
the natural sciences were considered germane to the new psychology,
the subject of psychological study exceeded the merely physical.150
Beginning with Wundt, the experimental psychologists studied the
physiological processes of movement, perception and sensation, but
146. See Leary, Kant and Modern Psychology, supra note 144, at 35-37; Turner, supra note
145, at 150.
147. Wilhelm Wundt, the founder of experimental psychology, called the new field
“physiological psychology,” and “taught his vast school that experimentation upon the model
laid down by sensory physiology is what differentiates the new psychology from the older
philosophical tradition.” Turner, supra note 145, at 150-51.
148. See HATFIELD, supra note 144, at 16. What I refer to here as “materialism” is the
belief that mind can be understood entirely by reference to its physical properties. Materialist
psychology falls within the broader category of empirical psychology or science—encompassing
modern neuropsychology—which posits the mind as operating according to a set system of laws
analogous to physics.
149. See supra note 145. The English philosophers Alexander Bain and Herbert Spencer in
their popular textbooks of psychology had successfully integrated the old philosophical
psychology with the new physiological physiology, but they did not themselves engage in
experimental research. See BAIN, MENTAL SCIENCE, supra note 86; HERBERT SPENCER, THE
PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (3d ed. 1926).
150. See HATFIELD, supra note 144, at 25-26.
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they also studied emotions, memory, dreaming, imagination, and
attention.151 The new psychology was an integrative science studying
the nervous system, consciousness and behavior together.152
Finally, the new psychologists were united in their opposition to
nativist theories of human nature. Instead they generally adhered to
the experiential view that mental ideas and beliefs are acquired
during the individual’s lifetime rather than given prior to experi-
ence.153 As Helmholtz explained, the experiential view “seeks to
demonstrate that at least no other forces are necessary for their
origin beyond the known faculties of our minds, even though these
forces themselves may remain entirely unexplained.”154 Following
Helmholtz, the new psychologists were all, to some degree,
committed to the experiential position that ideas and beliefs are
acquired during the lifetime of the individual rather than innately
given.155
151. See ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 280. English psychologists from this period did not
engage in experimental research, but they were no less students of consciousness than their
German counterparts. For example, Alexander Bain included chapters on intellect, ideas,
emotions, and will, along with the traditional physiological subjects of sensation and movement
in his treatise on psychology. See generally BAIN, MENTAL SCIENCE, supra note 86.
152. Daniel Robinson argues that Wundt’s commitment was neither to radical materialism
nor to radical idealism, but instead “to the psychology of consciousness, a science of mind as
mind,” which included “the facts of consciousness, itself, which established that significant
human actions proceed from volition, and that volition was not explainable in terms of neural
events.” ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 309. Beneath Wundt’s physiological psychology lay a
theory of volition or will in human nature. For discussion of the idealist element in Wundt’s
thinking, see David E. Leary, German Idealism and the Development of Psychology in the
Nineteenth Century, 18 J. HIST. PHIL. 299, 313 (1980) [hereinafter Leary, German Idealism].
153. “German philosophical psychology had stressed intuitionism—that is to say, the
doctrine of innate ideas, of a priori judgments, of native categories of the understanding. British
psychology was built about empiricism, the doctrine of the genesis of the mind through
individual experience.” BORING, supra note 104, at 304.
154. Id. at 305. Helmholtz referred to the experiential view as “empirism.” When
Helmholtz drew his famous distinction between empirism and nativism, he was engaged in a
debate over the causal origins of visual perception. See id.
155. The work of some early experimental physiologists such as Müller and Lotze, see id. at
261-70, retained strong elements of nativism and thus openly straddled the divide between
traditional philosophical psychology and the new experimental psychology. David Leary
explains how many of the ideas of German idealism influenced the new psychology, in Leary,
Kant and Modern Psychology, supra note 144, at 30-37.
Kant had set the empirical agenda for modern psychology; his theory of mental
functioning was, in his own terms, “transcendental,” see KITCHER, supra note 144, at 14-15; it
posited innate categories of understanding that served to organize information derived from
the senses. According to Kant, the geometric axioms and such physical axioms as causation,
time and space are examples of the mind’s a priori faculties. See BORING, supra note 104, at
305. When it came to psychology, therefore, it would appear that Kant was confusedly both an
empiricist and a nativist. Gary Hatfield argues that we can reconcile Kant’s empiricism and
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The remainder of this Part provides a more detailed exploration
of Holmes’s relationship to three main empirical schools of
psychology: German physiological psychology, British associationism,
and American functionalism. Each of these schools made their
presence felt in the intellectual life of educated Americans in the
mid- to late-nineteenth century, and each may be said to have
influenced Holmes’s psychological views. However, Holmes
ultimately refused to accept that the basic tenets of empirical
psychology were sufficient to explain the deeper dimensions in
human nature.
While Holmes’s view of human nature incorporated some
aspects of empirical psychology, the most important being an
emphasis on mental experience over philosophical speculation, his
idea of the unconscious ultimately cannot be squared with late-
nineteenth-century approaches to empirical psychology nor with the
utilitarian and pragmatic philosophies that often relied upon them.
This Part explores how his belief in unconscious motivations and
their effect on human behavior—their irrational, passionate, driven,
unknowable quality—distinguishes Holmes from the empirical
psychologists and legal thinkers of his day.
A. German Physiological Psychology
Nineteenth-century empirical psychology began in earnest with
German scientists156 working in the areas of physiology, physics and
astronomy.157 These scientists did not think of themselves as
psychologists, nor did they consider their subject matter to be
psychology; there would be no self-styled psychologists in Germany
or elsewhere until after 1860.158 Nevertheless, the discovery by
                                                                                                                                     
transcendentalism by viewing the former as a product of his naturalist psychology and the latter
as a product of his rationalist philosophy. See HATFIELD, supra note 144, at 77-87. For the most
part, the empirical psychologists viewed Kant’s nativism as sheer metaphysics. Helmholtz
directly challenged Kantian nativism in a series of papers arguing that the geometric axioms
are not innate but are arrived at by way of individual experience. See BORING, supra note 104,
at 306.
156. In the second half of the nineteenth century, “psychology was a Germanic science, and
Germany was the heart of the empire.” Peters & Mace, supra note 103, at 20. The roots of
empirical psychology might be traced back as far as Aristotle. See ROBINSON, supra note 29, at
51 (describing Aristotle’s psychology as a combination of empirical, associationist and
behaviorist principles). But see HATFIELD, supra note 144, at 22 (arguing that Aristotle’s
psychology was not empirical).
157. See BORING, supra note 104, at 31 (arguing that early-nineteenth-century students of
psychology considered themselves to be “psychologists, physicists or astronomers”).
158. See id.
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Charles Bell and Francois Magendie of the anatomical distinction
between sensory and motor nerves,159 the formulation of the law of
specific nerve energies by Bell and Johannes Müller,160 and Hermann
von Helmholtz’s theory of the conservation of energy161 are three
examples of the work carried out in the early to mid-nineteenth
century by this group of brilliant German scientists—a group which
also included Gustav Fechner, Wilhelm Wundt, G.E. Müller, Ernst
Brucke, Emil du Bois Raymond, and Carl Ludwig, among others.162
The appointment, in 1833, of the philosopher Johannes Müller to the
first chair in physiology “marked the recognition of physiology as an
independent sphere of science,” and launched the field of
experimental physiology.163 The most prominent physiologist of his
day,164 Müller formulated the law of specific nerve energies, the
doctrine “that the quality of experience is determined not by the
features of the objective stimulus but by the particular nerves
responding to it.”165 Müller himself never fully surrendered his
idealist beliefs, but his work was followed by a generation of
159. See id. at 31-32. Bell in 1811 and Magendie in 1822 separately discovered that “the
sensory fibers of a mixed nerve enter the spinal cord at a posterior (dorsal) nerve root, whereas
the motor fibers of the same nerve leave the cord by an anterior (ventral) root.” Id. at 27. The
Bell-Magendie law was important to psychology because it elevated confidence in the
experimental approach to the study of sensation and behavior and established the structural
basis for reflex formation. See ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 274.
160. Bell anticipated the law of specific nerve energies, but Müller is given credit for its
formal specification. For an explanation of the law, see ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 274-75.
161. Hermann von Helmholtz gave his famous paper discussing the principle of the
conservation of energy in 1847. See BORING, supra note 104, at 299.
162. The earlier generation of experimental physiologists, collectively known as the
Helmholtz School, has been called “one of the most remarkable groups of scientific workers
the world has ever seen.” BRETT’S HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 635 (R.S. Peters ed., 1962). As
Turner noted:
[The] physiological results [of the German school] so enriched the domain of sensory
psychology that they tempted many to believe that the future of psychology lay in a
more intimate connection with physiology and a greater reliance upon the experi-
mental method, which had obviously produced such important results for physiology
itself.
Turner, supra note 145, at 149.
163. BRETT’S HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 162, at 632. Prior to 1833, physiology
had been taught as a branch of medicine. See Peters & Mace, supra note 103, at 19.
164. See ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 274 (stating that Müller’s Handbuch der Physiologie
des Menschen “was the most authoritative work of the period”).
165. Id.
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experimental physiologists who openly embraced empirical
naturalism.166
Müller’s work directly inspired the great physicist Hermann von
Helmholtz and his young assistant, Wundt, the founder of the first
experimental psychology laboratory. Following von Helmholtz,
whom he assisted in the physiology institute at Heidelberg from 1858
to 1864,167 Wundt was committed to banishing the element of
biological vitalism present in the work of Müller.168 By the mid-
nineteenth century, psychologists in England and in the United States
were travelling to Germany to study with Helmholtz, Wundt, du Bois
Raymond and others, and their work was heavily influenced by the
experimental successes coming from Germany at this time.169
German physiological psychology did not adopt a completely
materialist attitude toward mind, focused exclusively on anatomical,
chemical and neurological factors. Wundt and his colleagues were
more broadly interested in the relationship between physiological
processes and consciousness; they studied reflexes and visual
perception as well as emotions, attention and memory.170 Physiologi-
cal psychology, both in Germany and abroad, studied the causal
relationship between bodily processes and mental states. Moreover,
Wundt’s work included an emphasis on concepts such as creative
166. As Daniel Robinson points out, Müller’s work on the law of specific nerve energies,
while it reflected the subjectivism of his Kantian idealism, nevertheless “placed the qualitative
and quantitative aspects of experience in the nerves, that is, in nature,” id. at 275, thereby
opening the door to empirical psychological research, see supra note 155.
167. See Turner, supra note 145, at 154.
168. See ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 278-79. Boring tells us that in 1845 four young,
enthusiastic and idealistic physiologists, all pupils of the great Johannes Müller, all later to be
very famous, met together and formed a pact to fight vitalism. See BORING, supra note 104, at
34. “They were, in order of age, Carl Ludwig, who was then twenty-nine, Emil du Bois-
Reymond, Ernst Brucke and Hermann von Helmholtz, then twenty-four. They were joining
forces to fight vitalism, the view that life involves forces other than those found in the
interaction of inorganic bodies.” Id. at 708. Boring has been criticized for overplaying the
successes of experimental psychology and understating the idealism present in Wundt’s
psychology. See Kurt Danziger, Wundt and the Two Traditions of Psychology, in WILHELM
WUNDT AND THE MAKING OF A SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 73 (R.W. Rieber ed., 1980)
[hereinafter THE MAKING OF A SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY].
169. See Peters & Mace, supra note 103, at 20. G. Stanley Hall and William James, the
founding fathers of American psychology, both traveled to Germany. Hall went from 1878 to
1880, and he “lived next door to Fechner, studied physiology in Ludwig’s laboratory, and
became Wundt’s first American student in the year of the founding of the Leipzig laboratory.”
BORING, supra note 104, at 519. For an account of James’s travels, see infra notes 186-94 and
accompanying text.
170. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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synthesis and social psychology that reflected some continuity with
the tradition of German philosophical idealism dating back to Kant.171
Physiological psychology adopted the methods of empirical science,
but many of its greatest proponents incorporated some idealist
elements into their empirical work.172 As we shall see, Holmes’s
Romantic psychology may claim an affinity with the integrative
approach of nineteenth-century German physiological psychology.
While Holmes never directly referred in his writings to the
experimental psychology being embraced by German scientists, we
know he was aware of it. To begin with, some of his Cambridge
contemporaries, including William James, traveled to Leipzig and
Berlin during the 1860s and 1870s to study experimental psychology
with Wundt and his colleagues.173 The work of British and American
psychologists well known to Holmes had been influenced by the ideas
emanating from Germany, and German psychology was being written
and talked about in the intellectual circles in which Holmes traveled.
His personal relationships with William James and Chauncey Wright
in the 1860s and 1870s, both of whom were enthusiastic about the
physiological studies being done in Germany, would alone have been
sufficient to have kept Holmes abreast of the major developments in
nineteenth-century psychology. Holmes occasionally joined James,
Wright, Charles Peirce and others who met regularly during 1871 and
1872 to discuss matters of philosophy,174 and the members of the
Metaphysical Club, as it is now called, certainly discussed the
significance of physiology for the domain of psychology.175 While
there is no direct evidence that Holmes was present when the
members of the Metaphysical Club debated physiological psychology,
the ideas were clearly in the Cambridge air at that time.
171. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
172. See generally Leary, German Idealism, supra note 152. Revisionist historical studies
have highlighted the idealist element in Wundt’s thinking. See, e.g., Arthur L. Blumenthal,
Wilhelm Wundt and Early American Psychology, in THE MAKING OF A SCIENTIFIC
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 168, at 118.
173. See infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
174. See WIENER, supra note 79, at 18-30. In 1927, Holmes remembered that “in those days
I was studying law and I soon dropped out of the band, although I should have liked to rejoin it
when it was too late.” Max H. Fisch, Alexander Bain and the Genealogy of Pragmatism, 15 J.
HIST. IDEAS 413, 414 n.6 (1954).
175. “Wright articulated an early stimulus-response theory of behavior, Peirce carried out
the first psychological experiments in the new world, and James laid the foundations of
American psychology with his book Principles of Psychology (1890).” THOMAS HARDY
LEAHEY, A HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY: MAIN CURRENTS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL THOUGHT 248
(2d ed. 1987).
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Moreover, in 1867 Holmes read The Correlation and Conserva-
tion of Forces,176 a collection of essays edited by Edward Youmans
that explored the issue of dynamic force, or vis viva, in psychology as
well as in the natural sciences. Leibniz had posited the existence of
primitive monads possessing a dynamic force—the vis viva—common
to all nature.177 Included among the essays in the Youmans volume is
one by Helmholtz, entitled On the Interaction of Natural Forces,
which contains his famous idea on the conservation of force as “a
new and universal natural law” in physics, biology, astronomy and
physiology.178 The concept of vis viva, or “living force,” was used by
Helmholtz in the mid-nineteenth century to “arrive at the conclusion
that Nature as a whole possesses a store of force which cannot in any
way be either increased or diminished.”179 Helmholtz’s law of the
conservation of force deeply influenced German physiological
psychologists, and, although his article does not directly address
psychology, the idea of vis viva as a constitutive element in mental
life is one of the general themes of the book.
The same year he read the Youmans book, Holmes also read
The Physiology and Pathology of the Mind, by the British
physiologist Henry Maudsley.180 An influential proponent of
physiological psychology,181 Maudsley was a militant materialist who
176. See infra note 188.
177. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. According to Leibniz, as well as his
followers such as Herbart, all ideas had a given amount of momentum or force and were always
in the process of either gaining or losing strength. See Leary, Herbart’s Mathematization of
Psychology, supra note 144, at 150. This dynamic mental process occurred in accordance with
the laws of the conservation of force, and took place on a continuum from the unconscious to
conscious awareness. “As mental phenomena gain in intensity (relative to the intensities of
other concurrent mental phenomena), they ‘rise’ to the peak of consciousness; as they lose their
intensity, they ‘sink’ toward and sometimes below the threshold of consciousness.” Id. at 153-
54.
178. H.L.F. Helmholtz, On the Interaction of Natural Forces, in THE CORRELATION AND
CONSERVATION OF FORCES 211, 211 (Edward L. Youmans ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co.,
2d ed. 1869) [hereinafter CORRELATION AND CONSERVATION].
179. Id. at 227. Because of its connection to the law of the conservation of energy, vis viva
allowed philosophers to believe, as Kant did not, that the laws of mental force could be
established in a mathematical and certain way. See Leary, Herbart’s Mathematization of
Psychology, supra note 144, at 154.
180. See Little, supra note 12, at 175. Maudsley was “largely responsible for the creation of
out-patient facilities in mental hospitals,” ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 307, and was well-
known for his powerful defense of the medical model of mental illness, see Kurt Danziger, Mid-
Nineteenth-Century British Psycho-Physiology: A Neglected Chapter in the History of
Psychology, in PROBLEMATIC SCIENCE, supra note 144, at 119, 137-38.
181. See Danziger, supra note 180, at 135 (calling Maudsley “an extremely influential figure
in his profession [of psychology] over a period of nearly half a century”).
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took reflex action to be the basic paradigm for the functioning of all
levels of the nervous system, including volitional action.182 Holmes
was also familiar with the work of Alexander Bain, whom he met in
England in 1866 and on whose work he explicitly relied in his own
writings.183 While known principally for his contribution to
associationist psychology, Bain was an early proponent of
physiological psychology as well. In a letter he wrote to John Stuart
Mill in 1851, Bain remarked that “[t]here is nothing I wish more than
so to unite psychology and physiology that physiologists may be
made to appreciate the true ends and drift of their researches into the
nervous system.”184 The importance of physiology and the study of
the nervous system to the “science of man” would have been
apparent to Holmes from reading both Maudsley and Bain.
Most important, however, was Holmes’s friendship with psy-
chologist William James, a relationship which flourished during the
period in which he was formulating his ideas for The Common Law
but which cooled considerably in later years.185 During the winter of
1866-67, the friendship between Holmes and William James was at its
most intimate, and James’s biographer tells us that the two
“wrangled” by the hour during the evenings over metaphysical issues.
In particular, we are told, Holmes and James were preoccupied by
the question of vis viva. James left for Germany in April 1867, and
wrote to Holmes from Berlin “inquiring after the results of his ‘study
of the vis viva question, and referring familiarly to their ‘dilapidated
old friend the Cosmos.’”186 Holmes replied on December 15, in a
letter that reveals a sentimental side not always apparent from his
published writings:
Oh! Bill, my beloved, how have I yearned after thee all this long
time. How I have admired those brave, generous and magnanimous
traits of which I will not shame thee by speaking. I am the better
that I have seen thee and known thee,—let that suffice . . . . May this
182. See id. Years after he published The Physiology and Pathology of the Mind, Maudsley
would write: “The conscious is but a superficial wave moving over the silent depths of the
unconscious.” HENRY MAUDSLEY, THE PHYSIOLOGY OF MIND 446 (London, MacMillan
1876).
183. See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
184. Letter from Alexander Bain to John Stuart Mill, quoted in ROBINSON, supra note 29,
at 273.
185. The two became close friends for a period when both were pursuing studies at
Harvard: Holmes in law and James in medicine. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 89.
186. Letter from William James to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Sept. 17, 1867), quoted in
PERRY, supra note 1, at 89.
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get to you in time to wish you a Happy New Year. By Heaven I
do,—vis viva must wait. There are stickers I can’t answer. But I
rather think you found difficulty—at least I did—in the insufficiency
of facts.187
It is not insignificant that the question of vis viva so occupied the
attention of Holmes and James from 1866 to 1868.188 Vis viva was
thought to provide a mechanistic explanation for activity in both the
natural and the mental spheres; it opposed vitalistic doctrines that
attributed a transcendent life force or anima to all living beings.189
Not surprisingly, Holmes’s devout father had openly rejected the
mechanistic doctrine of vis viva in favor of a metaphysical view of the
divine origin of mental forces:
187. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to William James (Dec. 15, 1867), quoted in
PERRY, supra note 1, at 90 (emphasis added). Holmes’s comment to James was strikingly
similar to the diary entry he made after meeting Alexander Bain two years earlier: “Excellent
for facts and criticism but not open to the infinite possibilities—Eh?” HOWE, SHAPING YEARS,
supra note 31, at 228.
188. From his diaries, we do know a bit about the level of agitation Holmes experienced in
the spring of 1867 in connection with vis viva. As Mark DeWolfe Howe describes:
On March 27 Holmes had begun his evening by reading Adams on Equity, but
dropped his studies to call on the Jameses in Cambridge, where he passed the time
‘with Bill who has been at work on measure of vis viva and imparted the ferment to
me.’ From that evening until April 23 Holmes pursued his quarry: on April 4 he had
“talk with Bill, highly satisfactory as to vis viva”; on April 10 he read essays on the
same subject in Youmans’ Correlation and Conservation of Forces; on April 21 he
“fiddled with vis viva” till he thought he would “go crazy”; again on the 22nd he
went to the Athenaeum “looking up v.v.” and then rushed to Cambridge “to see C.
Wright on vis viva—he wasn’t in so went to H. James.” On the 23rd the chase was
over: “End of vis viva I hope for the present. Understand some of my difficulties at
least. Evening . . . wrote in my note book as to vis viva.”
HOWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 31, at 255-56 (quoting Diary of Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr.). Holmes’s chase did not, in fact, end at that time. Several months later Holmes wrote to
James in Berlin that “since seeing you I have written three long letters to you at different
intervals on vis viva, each of which I was compelled to destroy because on reflection it
appeared either unsound or incomplete.” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to William
James (Dec. 15, 1867), quoted in PERRY, supra note 1, at 89.
189. Even the nineteenth-century physiologists most committed to the idea of vis viva
combined the mechanical law of the conservation of force with idealist or theistic thinking,
especially when it came to positing the ultimate source of this living force in nature. Helmholtz
concludes his discussion of the dynamics of living force in astronomy, physics, biology and
physiology with the following passage:
Thus the thread which was spun in darkness by those who sought a perpetual motion
has conducted us to a universal law of nature, which radiates light into the distant
nights of the beginning and of the end of the history of the universe. To our own race
it permits a long but not an endless existence; it threatens it with a day of judgment,
the dawn of which is still happily obscured. As each of us singly must endure the
thought of his death, the race must endure the same. But above the forms of life gone
by, the human race has higher moral problems before it, the bearer of which it is, and
in the completion of which it fulfils its destiny.
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The autocrat of the breakfast table taught his medical students that
mechanical force—the vis viva of Descartes, Leibnitz, and Helm-
holtz—“is only the name for the incomprehensible cause of certain
changes known to our consciousness, and assumed to be outside of
it. For me it is the Deity himself in action.”190
In contrast to his father, Holmes seemed troubled that vis viva, while
a desirable refutation of his father’s metaphysical views, was
nevertheless an insufficient account of mental processes.191
James spent the winter of 1872 in Berlin, where he attended
lectures on physiology by Emil Du Bois-Reymond, an important
member of the Helmholtz School; these lectures left James lamenting
that he had no “firm and thoroughly familiar basis of knowledge” in
the sciences of “mathematics, physics, chemistry, logic, and the
history of metaphysics.”192 James expressed his enthusiasm for
physiological psychology in a letter to his father:
I think now of going to Heidelberg. There are two professors there,
Helmholtz and Wundt, who are strong on the physiology of the
senses, and I hope I shall be well enough to do some work in their
laboratory . . . . My ultimate prospects are pretty hazy. If I only had
been well and could have got out here a year or two earlier to one of
these physiological laboratories, the way of life would have been
singularly simplified for me. At present my health is so uncertain
that I cannot look forward to teaching physiology. As a central point
of study I imagine that the border ground of physiology and psy-
chology, overlapping both, would be as fruitful as any, and I am now
working on to it.193
James returned to Cambridge and, despite his ill health, began in
1872 to teach courses in anatomy and physiology at Harvard, and in
                                                                                                                                     
Helmholtz, supra note 178, at 247. Helmholtz’s reference to “destiny” in this passage reminds
us that the mechanical laws of natural force were not always part of a mechanical or
despiritualized worldview. See Edward L. Youmans, Introduction to CORRELATION AND
CONSERVATION, supra note 178, at xi.
190. WIENER, supra note 79, at 173-74 (quoting O.W. HOLMES, MEDICAL ESSAYS 1842–
1882, at 219 (5th ed. 1888)). Philip Wiener concludes that, unlike his father, “[y]oung Holmes
regarded vis viva or the conservation of energy as in no need of divine concurrence,” id. at 174,
although his conclusion may somewhat misleadingly undervalue the difficulty Holmes had with
the doctrine.
191. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
192. Letter from William James to Thomas W. Ward (Nov. 7, 1867), quoted in PERRY,
supra note 1, at 84.
193. Letter from William James to Henry James, Sr. (Dec. 26, 1867), quoted in PERRY,
supra note 1, at 85.
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1875 began teaching a graduate course entitled “The Relations
Between Physiology and Psychology.”194 While James ultimately
abandoned physiological psychology,195 his goal to develop a “new
psychology” that combined scientific observation with speculative
thought could not have escaped Holmes’s attention at the time.
However absorbed Holmes may have been in editing Kent’s
Commentaries on American Law,196 he continued to associate
regularly with James during the period that James was lecturing on
physiology and setting up the country’s first psychological laboratory
at Harvard.197
The short-lived friendship between Holmes and James during
these few years was formed not in spite of their differences—James
the tender-minded philosopher and Holmes the tough-minded
lawyer—but at least in part because of a shared philosophical
aversion to absolute idealist philosophies.198 James’s lifelong effort to
instill a more pluralistic idealism into physiological psychology came
surprisingly close, in form if not in substance, to Holmes’s mature
views. Although Holmes would later criticize James’s tender-minded
attitude, it is not at all clear that Holmes disagreed with the notion
that human nature can only be fully comprehended in nonempirical
terms. Later in his life Holmes reflected on James’s “great keenness
in seeing into the corners of the human heart . . . a great psycholo-
gist—not a great philosopher, I always have thought him.”199 James
eventually left much of his skepticism behind for a more overtly
194. PERRY, supra note 1, at 182-83.
195. See WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN
HUMAN NATURE (1902) [hereinafter JAMES, VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE]. “The
new German mechanistic physiology had powerfully impressed him intellectually, but
oppressed him spiritually with its deterministic philosophical implications.” RAYMOND E.
FANCHER, PIONEERS OF PSYCHOLOGY 252 (3d ed. 1996).
196. See Letter from Mrs. Henry James to Henry James, Jr. (Feb. 28, 1873), quoted in
PERRY, supra note 1, at 98-99:
Wendell Holmes dined with us a few days ago. His whole life, soul and body, is
utterly absorbed in his last work upon his Kent. He carries about his manuscript in
his green bag and never loses sight of it for a moment . . . . His pallid face, and this
fearful grip upon his work, makes him a melancholy sight.
197. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 98-99; 182-83.
198. Each of them “abhorred traditional systems of static law and absolutist metaphysics.”
WIENER, supra note 79, at 172; see also Letter from William James to Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. (May 15, 1868), quoted in PERRY, supra note 1, at 94 (“The fact is, my dear boy, that I feel
more as if you were my ally against what you call ‘the common enemy’ than anyone I know.”).
199. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Morris R. Cohen (Feb. 16, 1925), in The
Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, 9 J. HIST. IDEAS 1, 43 (Felix S. Cohen ed., 1948).
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religious metaphysics,200 while Holmes—always less speculative and
more pessimistic than James—chose to maintain his distance from
religious or absolutist thinking.201 The intellectual bond between
Holmes and James in these early years captures something of
Holmes’s early, yet sustained, dissatisfaction with scientific
empiricism.202
Some insight into the complicated influence of James’s psychol-
ogy on Holmes may also be found in the fact that, in 1892, eleven
years after he published The Common Law, Holmes read three
books by the German philosopher-psychologist Hermann Lotze,
including Outlines of Psychology.203 The precipitating factor behind
Holmes’s reading of Lotze seemed to be the publication of James’s
abridged version of the Principles of Psychology, for James
considered Lotze to be the “deepest philosopher” of the day.204
Holmes also read at this time Josiah Royce’s recently published The
Spirit of Modern Philosophy, whose author had spent two years in
Germany studying with Lotze at Gottingen.205 In the century since
Lotze’s death,206 this once-prominent philosopher has become an
obscure figure in the history of psychology; Holmes’s reading of
Lotze was not even commented on by Mark De Wolfe Howe nor, it
seems, by any other scholar of Holmes’s work. Nevertheless,
Holmes’s interest in the German philosopher suggests that Holmes
had a much more sophisticated knowledge of the psychological
literature of his time than the commentary on Holmes would lead
one to believe. Lotze expounded a three-part program for the
development of a “scientific psychology”: (1) descriptive or empirical
psychology, (2) explanatory, mechanical or metaphysical psychology,
and (3) ideal or speculative psychology, the last of which provided an
account of the spiritual essence of the soul.207 The fact that Holmes
200. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 330.
201. See infra note 316.
202. See Mark DeWolfe Howe, Introductory Notes, The Letters of Henry James to Mr.
Justice Holmes (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library)
[hereinafter Howe, Introductory Notes, The Letters of Henry James] (making reference to
William James and Holmes, and noting the “considerable similarity in their ultimate beliefs”).
203. The two others were Outlines of Practical Philosophy and Outline of Metaphysics. See
Notes of Howe, Holmes’s Reading List, supra note 16, at Year 1892.
204. PERRY, supra note 1, at 329.
205. See FREDERICK COPLESTON, 8 A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 268 (1966).
206. Lotze died in 1881. See BORING, supra note 104, at 262.
207. See OUTLINE OF PSYCHOLOGY: DICTATED PORTIONS OF THE LECTURES OF
HERMANN LOTZE 119-28 (George T. Ladd ed. & trans., Ginn & Co. 1886) (1881).
DAILEY TO PRINTER ON MARCH 11 1999 03/13/99 9:59 PM
1998] HOLMES AND THE ROMANTIC MIND 471
developed a theory of the unconscious at odds with physiological
materialism and more akin to the work of James and Lotze is itself
indicative of the extent to which Holmes was in fact committed to the
nonempirical element—the “imaginative impulse”—in human
nature.
Given Holmes’s reading, his relationship with James, and the
general intellectual zeitgeist of the day, it seems reasonable to
conclude that Holmes was aware of the basic ideas constituting the
new physiological psychology. He never broached in writing the
subject of physiological psychology, and there is no reason to believe
that his view of human nature was directly shaped by the work of this
German school. Nevertheless, the indirect influence on Holmes
certainly existed; physiological psychology had a formative influence
on psychologists such as James who did directly influence Holmes.
Physiological psychologists were drawing attention to the concept of
unconscious processes, and their ideas likely provided intellectual
fodder for Holmes’s own theory of unconscious life. In the following
passage on the unconscious, Holmes borrows from the language of
late-nineteenth-century physiological psychology:
[T]he logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and
for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is
illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind the logical
form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of
competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious
judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole pro-
ceeding.208
Despite the reference to “root and nerve” here, Holmes, like
James, did not adopt the materialist view that unconscious elements
of the mind were actually constituted by emotional stimuli produced
by the body’s nervous system. Holmes’s reference to unconscious
nervous stimuli here served as a metaphor for legal decisionmaking,
not as a physiological explanation. Holmes appreciated the causal
relationship between “consciousness” and “nerve tissue”— “the total
is the datum,” as he put it209—but his idea of the unconscious went far
208. The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 466, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 3, at 397 (emphasis added).
209. In later years, Holmes expressed the view—in language that the nineteenth-century
German physiologists would have used—that “I don’t perceive why there is any more right to
think away consciousness than there is to think away nerve tissue—the total is the datum.”
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beyond that of German physiological psychology to encompass the
realm of unconscious feelings, irrational desires, and inner
transcendence.
B. British Associationist Psychology
In the spring of 1866, after receiving his degree from Harvard
Law School,210 the young Holmes traveled to Europe. On one of his
last evenings in London, he had dinner with John Stuart Mill, “with
whom was Mr. Bain, psychologist.”211 At the time, Alexander Bain
was a forty-eight year old Scottish philosopher who held the chair in
logic at the University of Aberdeen. Bain is best known for his
contribution to British associationist psychology, although his
influence was felt in the fields of physiological and functionalist
psychologies as well.212
Bain provides a useful point of departure for understanding
Holmes’s relationship to British associationist psychology for two
reasons. First, the meeting with Bain obviously made an impression
on the youthful Holmes. Bain’s The Emotions and the Will was
among the first works that Holmes read upon his return from
Europe, and Holmes explicitly relied upon Bain’s Mental Science in
the first lecture of The Common Law.213 Second, an understanding of
                                                                                                                                     
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Morris R. Cohen (July 21, 1920), in The Holmes-
Cohen Correspondence, supra note 199, at 19.
210. See HOWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 31, at 204.
211. Diary of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (June 11, 1866), quoted in HOWE, SHAPING
YEARS, supra note 31, at 228.
212. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 174, at 417-19, 425-27. Bain’s work, which was heavily
weighted in the direction of physiology, was particularly important to Holmes’s contemporaries
Charles Peirce and William James. See id. at 426. Chauncey Wright referred to Bain as “the
greatest of living psychologists,” id. at 430, and Wright’s work was closely associated with
Bain’s by several scholars, see id. at 431 & n.76. Moreover, both Wright and James used Bain’s
books in their courses on psychology. See id. at 429, 432.
There is no reason to believe that Bain ever read the early German physiologists, see
BORING, supra note 104, at 238, and he never engaged in experimental work. Nevertheless, his
physiological ideas developed contemporaneously with German physiological psychology,
although it was notably more philosophical and, perhaps for that reason, more influential in the
United States.
213. See THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 11. When Holmes met Bain in 1866, the
Scottish philosopher had already published his great two-volume treatise on psychology: The
Senses and the Intellect in 1855 and The Emotions and the Will in 1859, published together in
abridged form under the title Mental Science in 1868. See BORING, supra note 104, at 235;
Fisch, supra note 174, at 417-18. In 1870, the Holmeses borrowed Bain’s The Emotions and the
Will and The Senses and the Intellect, along with James Mill’s Analysis of the Phenomenon of
the Human Mind from the Athenaeum Library. See Fisch, supra note 174, at 426. Fisch also
notes that among the books from Holmes’s library which are now in the Library of Congress
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Bain’s ideas will help to clarify in what way Holmes’s thought cannot
be squared with the psychological premises of nineteenth-century
utilitarian jurisprudence.214 Bain was an associationist psychologist
with close personal ties to the utilitarian philosophers, particularly
John Stuart Mill,215 and a consideration of his work helps to explain
what led Holmes to reject the central tenets of the associationist
theory of ideas upon which classical utilitarian philosophy rested.216
Briefly summarized, associationism was a theory of mind that
understood all mental phenomena as the product of simple
impressions received from the senses.217 In the associationist view,
simple sense impressions were received by the mind and combined in
mechanical ways according to the laws of similarity and contiguity to
form complex ideas.218 Associationist doctrine did not originate with
Bain; the phrase “association of ideas” was first used by John
Locke,219 and the concept was also prominent in Hume’s philoso-
phy.220 Within the history of psychology, however, David Hartley is
                                                                                                                                     
are Bain’s Logic and Mental and Moral Science. See id. at n.54. They appear not to have been
read; the leaves were never cut apart. See id.
214. David Luban, discussing Holmes’s rejection of basic utilitarian principles, provides the
following useful summary of classical utilitarian thought:
U.1. Actions should be assessed according to their consequences.
U.2. The relevant consequences are those pertaining to human welfare.
U.3. Human welfare is assessed by summing the welfare of all affected individuals.
U.4. In performing this addition, each one counts for one and none for more than
one.
Luban, supra note 31, at 518. As Luban explains, the “classical hedonistic utilitarians identified
welfare with happiness or pleasure.” Id.
215. Bain developed a close working relationship with the younger Mill, and his
associationist ideas deeply influenced Mill’s own work, especially A System of Logic, the final
draft of which Bain helped to revise. See POHLMAN, supra note 42, at 124; George E. Davie,
Alexander Bain, in 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 243, 243 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
216. For a full discussion of the contribution of associationist psychology to utilitarian
thought, see POHLMAN, supra note 42, at 116-26.
217. See Woodward, Stretching the Limits, supra note 145, at 96-98; POHLMAN, supra note
42, at 119.
218. See HOWARD C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE ASSOCIATION PSYCHOLOGY 3-9
(1921).
219. See JOHN LOCKE, Of the Association of Ideas, in 1 AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING 527 (Alexander Campbell Fraser ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1894) (1690).
The idea had distant roots in Aristotle’s laws of the association of remembered images and
sensations. See WARREN, supra note 218, at 4.
220. See ELIE HALÉVY, THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHIC RADICALISM 9 (Mary Morris
trans., 1928); ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 177-78 (citing DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATURE (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Clarendon Press 1973) (1740)).
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the recognized founder of the modern principle of association.221
Hartley’s Observations on Man was the first psychological work to
synthesize Newtonian physics and sensory physiology within the
framework of associationism.222 Hartley’s theory of associationism
exerted a considerable influence on utilitarian thought, for he
assumed, “as Hume and every cobbler in England did, that pleasure
and pain are the glue that binds our associations.”223 Bentham
referred to Hartley’s work in his Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation, where Bentham acknowledged that he
learned from Hartley “to treat happiness as a sum of simple
pleasures, united by association.”224
Associationist psychology was formally introduced into utilitar-
ian philosophy by James Mill,225 whose 1829 work, Analysis of the
Phenomena of the Human Mind, marked the historical highpoint of
associationist psychology. Associationist psychology appealed to
utilitarian philosophers such as the Mills and Bain in part because it
provided a scientifically empirical account of mental phenomena: to
the extent that the mind mechanically associated certain sensations
with pleasure and others with pain, an empirical psychological
foundation for utilitarian ethics was established. By reducing mental
life to its simplest empirical elements, associationism established a
positivist and inductive scientific foundation from which the
utilitarians could launch their political reforms. From the associa-
tionist viewpoint, the determination of “the greatest happiness of the
greatest number” could be made strictly on empirical and
quantitative grounds.226
Alexander Bain and John Stuart Mill, each in their own way,
adopted the framework of associationist psychology developed by
James Mill while rejecting its mechanical and passive view of mental
processes.227 Bain’s emphasis on mental activity surmounted the worst
mechanistic tendencies of James Mill’s associationism by integrating
221. See HALÉVY, supra note 220, at 7.
222. See ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 250-51. Hartley “reduced the explanation of the facts
to the simplest possible terms, and brought all associations under the single heading of
association by contiguity.” HALÉVY, supra note 220, at 8.
223. ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 251.
224. HALÉVY, supra note 220, at 8 (citing Bentham). Bentham also defined the important
influence of habit as involving the operation of the principle of the association of ideas. See id.
225. See POHLMAN, supra note 42, at 116.
226. See id. at 12.
227. In fact, Bain assisted John Stuart Mill in revising Mill’s System of Logic in 1842. See
Davie, supra note 215, at 243.
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a volitional component into psychological processes, although
volition itself was a concept that appeared to violate the utilitarian
rejection of “will” as a fictitious entity.228 As Max Fisch observed,
“Bain sets out to maintain and to elaborate the doctrine of the
association of ideas, but he quite transforms it by introducing a
physiological basis and more especially by appealing to the ‘inherent
activity of the system.’”229 By focusing attention on the physiology of
will, which constituted the fourth and final book in his treatise The
Mental Science, Bain’s work seemed to bridge the divide between
traditional associationism and the new empirical psychology.
While Bain sought to introduce a conception of human volition
into associationist psychology, his ideas did not appear to satisfy the
young Holmes. In his diary, Holmes described himself as being
“struck with the absence of imaginative impulse, especially in Mr.
Bain—excellent for facts and criticism but not open to the infinite
possibilities—Eh?”230 Holmes appreciated associationist psychology
for its defiance of metaphysical psychology and for its empirical
approach to mental life, but he also appeared inclined to think that
associationism—as represented by its most important contemporary
spokesperson—was limited to “facts and criticism.” What was
missing in associationist thought for Holmes was the “imaginative
impulse” capable of entertaining “infinite possibilities.” Holmes
appeared to share William James’s dissatisfaction with association-
ism’s reduction of mind to elements lacking any animating
principle—an imaginative impulse, for example—uniting those
elements into a unified whole.231
Directly upon his return from Europe, Holmes read the second
volume of Bain’s two-volume work, The Emotions and the Will.232 The
fact that Holmes chose to read this particular volume suggests that he
228. See POHLMAN, supra note 42, at 113-14; COPLESTON, supra note 205, at 93-94. See also
BORING, supra note 104, at 236 (“[Bain] represented the culmination of associationism and the
beginning of its absorption into physiological psychology.”); BRETT’S HISTORY OF
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 162, at 459 (noting than Bain, having “restat[ed] with remarkable
fullness and completeness the whole doctrine of Associationism. . . . actually transgressed his
own limits as he advanced”).
229. Fisch, supra note 174, at 419. The element of activity in Bain’s idea of mental
processes would become the basis for his definition of belief, and an important influence on
pragmatist philosophers. See infra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
230. Diary of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (June 11, 1866), quoted in HOWE, SHAPING
YEARS, supra note 31, at 228.
231. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 195.
232. See Little, supra note 12, at 172.
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had decided—perhaps on the advice of Bain or Mill—to search for
evidence of the “imaginative impulse” in Bain’s work; the first
volume of Bain’s treatise focused on sense, movement, instinct and
intellect, the core subjects within traditional associationist thought,233
but the second volume that Holmes read upon his return went
beyond traditional associationist psychology to discuss affective and
volitional components of mental life such as feelings, motives, belief
and will.234 Nevertheless, if Holmes had been searching for evidence
of the imaginative impulse in this volume, he would have been
disappointed since Bain’s concept of volition remained, as discussed
above, physiological.235
If the only evidence of Holmes’s criticism of associationism was
this brief remark on Bain in his travel diary, we should hesitate to say
more, especially because Holmes clearly admired Bain’s effort to
develop an empirical psychology: he read Bain’s work, he cited to it
in The Common Law, and he expressly referenced associationist
psychology.236 Holmes also advanced an argument for criminal
deterrence that is consistent with utilitarian thought and thus, to
some minds, suggests that he held associationist views.237 It is also
233. This volume—entitled Movement, Sense, and Intellect—was primarily a physiological
study and established the important link between associationist psychology and the work being
done by German physiologists. See supra notes 156-72 and accompanying text. The second
volume—The Intellect—was a straightforward explication of the processes of association.
234. See BAIN, THE EMOTIONS AND THE WILL (New York, Appleton & Co. 3d ed. 1888).
While Holmes may not have found in this volume the “imaginative impulse” he had found
lacking in Bain personally, he did find the discussion of revenge that he later relied upon in The
Common Law. See BAIN, MENTAL SCIENCE, supra note 86, at 260-67. He would also have run
across the definition of “belief” so influential with his intellectual contemporaries in
Cambridge. See id. at 371-85.
235. Bain even went so far as to criticize Wilhelm Wundt, the founder of experimental
psychology, for “the treatment of Association, as almost exclusively an affair of motives.”
Alexander Bain, On “Association” Controversies, 12 MIND 161, 180-81 (1887).
236. See The Law in Science, supra note 33, at 447, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS,
supra note 3, at 408-09 (“The early law embodied hatred for any immediate source of hurt,
which comes from the association of ideas and imperfect analysis.”). Bain’s introduction of
physiology into psychology was considered a crucial step in the development of a mental
science that involved a unified study of the mind as both consciousness and matter. See
Introductory Notice, in BAIN, MENTAL SCIENCE, supra note 86, at 5, 5-6. Hume had first sought
to create “a cataloguing of mental phenomena, in order to uncover the elements of the mind,
together with an attempt to discover universal principles, or general laws, that account for the
combinations and dynamic relations among the mental elements.” HATFIELD, supra note 144,
at 26. Hume, like Bain, found these laws in the concept of association. See id.
237. See THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 48-49. In support of his view that Holmes was
an associationist thinker, H.L. Pohlman argues that Holmes’s theory of “can’t helps” was an
associationist concept:
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certainly true that his emphasis on innate self-preference resembled
the psychological hedonism of nineteenth-century utilitarian thought,
and his support for subordinating private interests to the public
welfare resembled the utilitarian goal of promoting “the greatest
happiness of the greatest number.”238 Nevertheless, Holmes clearly
was not a strict utilitarian in the nineteenth-century tradition of
Bentham and Austin.239 He explicitly rejected the greatest happiness
principle, preferring instead to base law on the Darwinian belief in
the survival of the fittest.240 More significant for the present
discussion, Holmes’s thought conflicted with at least two central
tenets of the “mental science” that informed nineteenth-century
utilitarian thought: the doctrine of anti-nativism and the denial of
unconscious mental processes.
With respect to the doctrine of anti-nativism, Holmes did not
adhere to the experiential view that all ideas derive from the senses.
The emotion of revenge, for example, which most associationist
psychologists would have viewed as the product of experience,
Holmes described as an instinctual force whose elemental origins
transcend individual experience. Utilitarians, too, described human
beings in instinctual terms, but their associationist psychology tended
to reduce innate faculties to the desire for pleasure and the avoidance
of pain.241 Instincts arose as a stimulus to pleasure; the need for
revenge, for example, was less an instinct than a result of an
experience by which vengeance became associated with pleasure.242 In
                                                                                                                                     
The psychological laws of the human mind turn truth into a system of ‘can’t helps’
and therefore a set of intellectual limitations. . . . Each person was therefore trapped
in the associations of his personal experience; what he believed revealed more con-
cerning the limitations of his experience than the nature of reality.
POHLMAN, supra note 42, at 127. Although Holmes did seem open to the idea that some beliefs
are arrived at by way of association, there is nothing necessarily associationist about Holmes’s
“can’t helps”—compelled beliefs might just as easily come to one by way of transcendental
insight or intuition.
238. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 3 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1977). The first edition of Bentham’s work was published in
1776 as an introduction and commentary to Blackstone’s Commentaries.
239. See Luban, supra note 31, at 517-23.
240. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Gas-Stokers’ Strike, 7 AM. L. REV. 582, 583
(1873), reprinted in 1 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 323, 325.
241. Bain in fact defines instinct as limited to the rudimentary abilities of the infant—reflex
actions, primitive movements, expressions of joy or anger or sorrow—and the “germs of
volition,” which include the instinct for “self-conservation” and the desire for acquisitions. See
BAIN, MENTAL SCIENCE, supra note 86, at 68-81.
242. See id. at 260-61 (discussing revenge as a form of “irascible emotion” resulting from
the “pleasure of malevolence” associated with inflicting harm on others). James Mill does not
even address the topic of instincts in his comprehensive treatise on associationist psychology.
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contrast, Holmes depicted the individual as a being subject to the
vicissitudes of innate passions such as revenge.243 Unlike associationist
thinkers, Holmes did not view the mind in passive and mechanical
ways operating in response to the experience of pleasure and pain.
He did acknowledge the role that habit played in mental life,
particularly with respect to the survival of traditional ways of
thinking.244 But however important, habit was not the only, or even
among the major, psychological processes at work. In his discussions
of psychological animism and revenge, Holmes depicted the human
mind as possessing dynamic elements of its own. The primitive desire
for revenge, Holmes suggested, arises from within and motivates the
individual to act.
Second, Holmes, as we have seen, was very much interested in
the realm of unconscious thoughts and feelings. In contrast,
associationists studied the phenomenon of consciousness; the idea of
the unconscious did not mesh well with empirical psychologies
favoring observable phenomena and verifiable laws. The utilitarian
antipathy to the unconscious emerged full-blown in the philosophical
exchange between John Stuart Mill and Sir William Hamilton over
the existence of the unconscious, an exchange in which Holmes
appeared to take a particular interest.245 A Scottish philosopher who
borrowed from German idealism,246 Hamilton had set out his theory
of “unconscious modifications” in his Lectures on Metaphysics and
Logic, to which John Stuart Mill wrote a well-known reply, An
Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Metaphysics.247 Mill, drawing
                                                                                                                                     
See JAMES MILL, ANALYSIS OF THE PHENOMENA OF THE HUMAN MIND (John Stuart Mill ed.,
1869).
243. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
244. See The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 469, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS,
supra note 3, at 398-99.
245. Having read both Hamilton and Mill just prior to his trip to Europe in 1866, Holmes
was certainly aware of this early debate over the unconscious, and it is not unlikely that his
view of the effect of unconscious thoughts and feelings on conscious behavior came directly
from Hamilton’s treatise. Around this time, Holmes also read the following works directly
addressing the “Hamilton v. Mill” debate, as Holmes referred to it: David Masson, Recent
British Philosophy: A Review, With Criticisms; Including Some Comments on Mr. Mill’s Answer
to Sir William Hamilton; James McCosh, An Examination of Mr. J.S. Mill’s Philosophy;
Herbert Spencer, The Test of Truth. See Little, supra note 12, at 171-74.
246. See BRETT’S HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 162, at 448.
247. Hamilton asked “[w]hether the mind exerts energies, and is the subject of
modifications, of neither of which it is conscious.” SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Lecture XVIII, in
1 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS AND LOGIC 338 (Rev. H.L. Mansel & John Veitch eds.,
Edinburgh, William Blackwood & Sons 7th ed. 1882). He answered the question in the
affirmative. See id. at 347-48. Mill quoted passages which capture Hamilton’s theory in its full:
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on associationist psychology, rejected Hamilton’s belief in the
unconscious out of hand.248 At most, Mill was willing to concede the
possibility of unconscious physiological processes, such as might
occur in visual perception when a wheel of seven colors spins and
creates the impression of a solid eighth color.249 To Mill, unconscious
ideas or feelings simply did not exist.
Hamilton’s theory of the unconscious to which Mill so vehe-
mently objected was notably like the theory of the unconscious
presented by Holmes in The Common Law. In language strikingly
similar to that which would be used by Holmes, Hamilton maintained
his belief in “mental modifications,—i.e. mental activities and
passivities, of which we are unconscious, but which manifest their
existence by effects of which we are conscious.”250 Nevertheless, while
Holmes shared Hamilton’s belief in the unconscious, he clearly did
not share Hamilton’s more general criticism of scientific empiri-
cism.251 It cannot be denied that Holmes was an ally of the
                                                                                                                                     
“[T]he sphere of our conscious modifications is only a small circle in the centre of a far wider
sphere of action and passion, of which we are only conscious through its effects.” JOHN STUART
MILL, AN EXAMINATION OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON’S PHILOSOPHY 345 (London, Longmans,
Green & Co. 6th ed. 1889) (quoting HAMILTON, supra, at 349). In his book, Mill devoted an
entire chapter, which he entitled “Sir William Hamilton’s Doctrine of Unconscious Mental
Modifications,” id. at 341, to respond to Hamilton’s argument; he referred to Hamilton’s
position as “in opposition to most English philosophers,” id.
248. Mill argued:
And [physiology] may be the source of many of those states of internal or mental
feeling which we cannot distinctly refer to a prototype in experience, our experience
only supplying the elements from which, by this kind of mental chemistry, they are
composed. The elementary feelings may then be said to be latently present, or to be
present but not in consciousness. The truth, however, is, that the feelings themselves
are not present, consciously or latently, but that the nervous modifications which are
their usual antecedents have been present, while the consequents have been frus-
trated, and another consequent has been produced instead.
MILL, supra note 247, at 357.
249. See id. at 357 n.*. John Stuart Mill came close to developing a theory of mental
creativity, but his notion of synthesis—which sounded so promising—remained a largely
mechanistic theory of mental creativity. See Danziger, supra note 180, at 80-81.
250. 1 HAMILTON, supra note 247, at 347. Hamilton went even further than approving
unconscious mentations: “I do not hesitate to maintain, that what we are conscious of is
constructed out of what we are not conscious of,—that our whole knowledge, in fact, is made
up of the unknown and the incognisable.” Id. at 348.
251. Writing to H.H. Brownell in 1865, Holmes commented:
Law, of which I once doubted, is now my enthusiastic pursuit. I am up to my ears in it
all the time. One good thing about it is that it makes play of what otherwise would be
work, e.g. Metaphysics. Such spongy stuff as Sir William Hamilton, for instance, after
a little pile of Contingent Remainders or Pleading goes down like macaroni. You
give a little suck, and pwip!! you’ve swallowed it and never known it.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Henry Howard Brownell (Oct. 31, 1865), quoted in
HOWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 31, at 203.
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nineteenth-century utilitarian philosophers insofar as they opposed
the metaphysical idealism that Hamilton’s philosophy represented.
Yet unlike the classical utilitarian philosophers, who might
legitimately be criticized for reducing human nature to a hedonistic
psychology of pleasure and pain, Holmes did not embrace
associationism as a satisfactory account of mental life. He drew upon
associationism in developing his ideas about the importance of
habitual ways of thinking in legal decisionmaking. Nevertheless, his
idea of the unconscious is perhaps the clearest indication that Holmes
rejected the empirical limitations of associationist psychology and,
consequently, the classical utilitarian philosophy that drew upon it.
C. American Functionalism
The influence of German physiological psychology on the early
development of American psychology, or “functionalism,” cannot be
overstated. Some of the country’s most important psychologists came
from Germany, and many others traveled to Germany to study with
Wundt at his laboratory in Leipzig.252 G. Stanley Hall established the
first formal psychological laboratory at Johns Hopkins in 1883,
modeled on the Leipzig laboratory.253 But however similar in
appearance, American psychology asserted its distinctness early on
with its enthusiasm for Darwinian theory.254 Primarily the offspring of
William James and John Dewey,255 American psychology understood
human consciousness to be an evolutionary adaptation to man’s
changing environmental circumstances; in the functionalist view,
consciousness had evolved to help man meet the more complex
252. See BORING, supra note 104, at 505. William James expressed a desire to study with
Hermann von Helmholtz and Wilhelm Wundt during his travels to Germany, but he only got as
far as Dresden and Berlin. See Letter from William James to Thomas W. Ward (Autumn,
1867), quoted in PERRY, supra note 1, at 181.
253. See BORING, supra note 104, at 20.
254. See Letter from William James to Charles Eliot (Dec. 2, 1875), quoted in WIENER,
supra note 79, at 98 n.*:
A real science of man is now being built up out of the theory of evolution and the
facts of archeology, the nervous system and the senses. It has already a vast material
extent, the papers and magazines are full of essays and articles having more or less to
do with it.
255. John Dewey was the organizing force behind the Chicago school of functional
psychology in the late nineteenth century. See BORING, supra note 104, at 552. He published a
textbook entitled Psychology in 1886, a philosophical treatise on the new psychology that
reflected the Hegelian views of his early years. See ALAN RYAN, JOHN DEWEY AND THE HIGH
TIDE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 74 (1995).
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problems posed by civilized society.256 James was the first to
formulate a functional theory of consciousness, and his psychological
ideas provided an empirical foundation for the pragmatist philosophy
he spawned.257 James emphasized individual will as a fact of human
nature that served to unify mental processes by reference to
functional ends. The pragmatists rejected the atomistic elementalism
of associationist psychology in favor of a unified consciousness
oriented toward practical consequences.
In contrast to the German system, which was primarily a descrip-
tive science aimed at discovering the general structure of mental
processes, American psychology was a study of the mind in use.258
Structural psychologists, represented in the nineteenth century by
both the physiological psychology of Wundt and the associationist
psychology of Bain, were more interested in describing mental
processes than in understanding them. Functionalist psychologists
shared with dynamic psychologists, whose most famous representa-
tive was Freud, an interest in the question of why human beings act
and think in particular ways. Freudian psychology explained human
behavior in terms of subjective motivation whereas American
functionalism focused on consequences, but both were purposive
psychologies interested in the meaning of human behavior. With
their particular emphasis on evolutionary adaptation, Americans
“changed the pattern of psychological activity from the description of
the generalized mind to the assessment of personal capacities in the
successful adjustment of the individual to his environment.”259 By
1934, Joseph Jastrow, writing for the Encyclopaedia of the Social
Sciences, could assert that in the United States “substantially all
current psychology is functional in scope and purpose.”260
Darwinian ideas were not the only addition American psycholo-
gists made to the basic experimental framework imported from
256. See BORING, supra note 104, at 551.
257. “American psychology [in the late nineteenth century] went functional, assessing mind
and mental activity in terms of use and survival value. William James was the first to see
psychology this way. John Dewey supported him. Together they brought functional gospel into
philosophy as pragmatism.” BORING, supra note 104, at 243. As Boring explains, “With all this
in mind we can see meaning in what otherwise would seem a paradox, that James could in 1876
offer the first course on physiological psychology in America and also use as a text Spencer’s
Principles of Psychology.” Id.
258. See id. at 506.
259. Id. at 507.
260. Joseph Jastrow, Psychology, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 588, 593
(Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alan Johnson eds., 1934).
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Germany. Although Americans were not predisposed toward the
mechanism and elementalism of British associationism, Alexander
Bain’s theory of belief did have a formative influence on the
psychological ideas of pragmatist philosophers such as Charles Peirce
and William James. In a famous reference to Bain, Peirce described
Bain’s definition of “belief” as “that upon which a man is prepared to
act,” a definition from which “pragmatism is scarce more than a
corollary.”261 James Mill had defined “belief” as the product of
“indissoluble association,”262 a classic associationist concept appealing
to mechanical mental processes. Bain moved beyond Mill’s definition
by appealing to “the inherent activity of the system”;263 he concluded
that our beliefs exist in relation to our willingness to act upon them.
In the 1868 edition of Bain’s Mental Science, which Holmes read in
preparation for writing The Common Law, the chapter on belief is
revealingly located in the section of the book entitled “The Will.”
Volition, or activity, was the defining element of Bain’s system of
belief, and it was the defining element of the pragmatists’
functionalist psychology, too.
In many ways, Holmes’s psychology exhibited some distinctively
American characteristics. To begin with, Holmes—like Darwin—was
a nativist. He viewed mind as constituted by native elements, in
particular instinctual passions and desires. His belief in the instinct
for self-preservation and his description of man’s innately aggressive
and vengeful nature have elements of the Darwinian orientation of
functionalist psychology. Like James, who developed a complex
theory of instincts, which he believed numbered over thirty,264 the
functionalists posited the biological origin of certain human traits and
capabilities.265 In contrast to the mechanical processes of association-
ism and the physiological processes of the German school, Holmes
described human beings as acting on inner psychological forces:
revenge, self-protection, sexual desire.266 This concept of mental
activity was shared by the functionalists, who tied mental activity to
the human organism’s drive to survive and who premised belief on
the individual’s willingness to act.
261. 5 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS: PRAGMATISM AND
PRAGMATICISM 7 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1934).
262. MILL, supra note 242, at 368.
263. Fisch, supra note 174, at 419.
264. See WIENER, supra note 79, at 112.
265. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 195.
266. See supra Part I.A.
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Holmes shared with functionalist psychologists a view of the
mind in action, but his conception of mental activity could not have
been more opposed to that of the pragmatic philosophers. While
adaptation was the raison d’être of mental activity in the functionalist
view, conflict was the defining characteristic of Holmes’s psychology.
Central to Holmes’s theory was the idea that the egoistic needs of
human beings are in conflict with their social needs, and that the
purpose of law is to keep men from satisfying their egoistic needs at
the expense of the social good.267 In this respect, Holmes’s psychology
clearly differed from the functional psychology developed by Peirce,
James and Dewey.268 There is very little in Holmes’s written work to
suggest that he viewed man’s emotional life primarily as an adaptive
response to his environment; to the contrary, Holmes was aware of
the extent to which law must bend to innate psychological needs.269
While it is true that Holmes perceived the plasticity of instinctual
expression—the idea that the form of instinctual gratification changes
over time—he seemed convinced that instinctual needs basically
remain constant.270 It was this element of innate conflict that rendered
Holmes’s view of human nature so much more pessimistic than the
American functionalists’ more optimistic belief in the unfolding of
human adaptation.
Finally, Holmes’s psychology differed from functionalism in its
basic orientation. As described above, functionalism—the
psychological arm of pragmatism—was a practical science oriented to
the study of mind in use. In contrast, Holmes was interested in the
issue of dynamic motivation: The Common Law was, at bottom, a
study in revenge as the motivational source of law. Functionalism
explains mental processes by reference to their consequences,
267. Freud would explain this conflict in intrapsychic terms as a conflict between the id and
the ego. See FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID, supra note 77, at 35-37.
268. Holmes’ psychology also prefigured—in broad outline—the dynamic psychology of
Freud. See infra notes 381-83 and accompanying text. While it might be possible to adopt the
functionalist view that mental activity serves the end of helping the individual adapt to his or
her environment, and yet still acknowledge the conflict that attends that process, I do not
believe that there is any evidence that Holmes held this more moderate view. Instead, Holmes
consistently emphasized the individual’s selfish and aggressive instincts, the Malthusian
principle of social domination, and an often callous disregard for the less fortunate participants
in man’s struggle for survival. See infra notes 369-71 and accompanying text.
269. See HOWE, PROVING YEARS, supra note 90, at 214 (“In connection with problems of
possession he emphasized the same consideration which had moved him towards his central
conclusions with respect to criminal law—the necessity, as he saw it, that the law accept human
nature as it finds it.”).
270. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
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whereas Holmes’s psychology was more often concerned with the
subjective causes of human behavior. Holmes was instrumental when
it came to designing a workable system of law, but he did not view
human nature entirely in terms of the consequences of behavior. And
although he advocated banishing subjective motivation from legal
scrutiny,271 thereby enshrining behaviorism as the standard of legal
liability, he did not share the behaviorist antipathy toward
introspective theories of mind.272 To the contrary, Holmes’s basis for
rejecting subjectivism as a legal standard reflected his awareness of
the dynamic and often opaque complexities underlying human
behavior. The clear trend in American psychology in the late
nineteenth century was against dynamic theories in the direction of
functional and, eventually, behaviorist approaches.273 Holmes resisted
this development by focusing on the motivational forces—both
conscious and unconscious—in human nature. This dynamic element
in his thinking, which so presciently anticipated Freud’s creation of
psychoanalytic psychology, sharply distinguished Holmes from the
prominent American psychologists of his day.
Although Holmes’s views on human nature did not conform to
any of the three major schools of empirical psychology, it would be a
mistake to conclude that late-nineteenth-century empirical
psychology as a whole did not leave its mark on Holmes’s work.
Holmes brought an empirical, rather than logical or rationalist,
temperament to all his spheres of inquiry, and psychology was no
exception. As we have seen, empirical psychology had much to offer
Holmes regarding the association of ideas, vis viva, the unconscious,
instincts, and human purposiveness. With his enthusiasm for the
external standard of liability, Holmes confirmed that empirical—
indeed, behaviorist—approaches are desirable, if not sometimes
271. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., J.B. Watson, Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It, in A SOURCE BOOK IN
THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 507, 513-14 (Richard J. Herrnstein & Edmund G. Boring eds.,
1965) (promoting a psychology that would “never use the terms consciousness, mental state,
mind, content, . . . imagery, and the like”).
273. Functionalism started off interested in the use to which subjective thoughts and ideas
were put, but the focus on activity soon led American psychologists in the direction of the study
of behavior proper. Eventually, functional psychology, which began as an introspective
psychology of the mind, gave way to the study of the observable effects of mind on human
behavior, or behaviorist psychology. See BORING, supra note 104, at 506. Paradoxically, to the
extent that functional psychology was in some ways the natural precursor of both the objective
science of behaviorism and the subjective science of dynamic psychology, it stressed both
observable activity and purposive behavior. See id.
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necessary, in law. The empirical determination of how an individual
acts is all that should matter, in Holmes’s view, in the application,
although not formulation, of legal rules. While Holmes clearly
believed in the importance of facts, he eventually concluded that
more than facts were needed to understand the full range of
subjective human experience. The inability of empirical psychology
to comprehend the imaginative, irrational and unconscious elements
of individual experience is what drove Holmes to develop a
nonempirical psychology constructed neither from the theology of his
father nor from the rationalism of the philosophers, but from the era
of Romantic literature and philosophy.
III. ROMANTIC HORIZONS
To reconcile oneself to life—to dimly apprehend that this dream
disturbing the sleep of the cosm is not the result of dyspepsy, but is
well—to suspect some of the divine harmonies, though you cannot
note them like a score of music—these things, methinks, furnish
vanishing points which give a kind of perspective to the chaos of
events.274
For the few short years it lasted, Holmes’s friendship with
William James reflected a kinship of mind and spirit. In a letter dated
December 15, 1867 to James, Holmes confided that “[i]n spite of my
many friends I am almost alone in my thoughts and inner feelings,”275
a loneliness alleviated by the thought of James’s companionship. The
condition of inner solitude would burden Holmes throughout his
career, but was also, to his mind, the price one must pay for
“intellectual ambition.”276 Along with solitude, the themes of heroism,
faith, will, nature, imagination, and dangerous action would form the
Romantic core of Holmes’s view of human nature and give content to
his endeavor to make the study of law “heroic,” an endeavor that
appeared to begin where the rational study of law left off.277 This Part
explores the Romantic view of human nature present in Holmes’s
writings, although no claim is made that Holmes was a Romantic
274. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to William James (Apr. 19, 1868), quoted in
PERRY, supra note 1, at 92.
275. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to William James (Dec. 15, 1867), quoted in
PERRY, supra note 1, at 90.
276. The Profession of the Law, supra note 10, at 472.
277. Speaking to Harvard undergraduates in 1886, Holmes said, “I point to that which will
make your study heroic.” Id.
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generally. Rather, the more modest aim here is to illuminate the
important influence of eighteenth-century Romantic ideas about
human nature on Holmes’s thought, and to show how these ideas
mediated, as well as complicated, his general enthusiasm for scientific
empiricism in law.
A. German and English Romantic Influences
The swift rise of empirical psychology in the second half of the
nineteenth century was an extraordinary development, but one not
without its critics. Most contemporary observers took the work being
done by the new experimental psychologists to be valuable, but some
were also dismayed by the failure of empirical psychology to develop
a meaningful account of motivational sources and mental activity.278
Critics such as William James returned to religious thinking in order
to escape empiricism’s inevitable reduction of mind to its material or
behavioral properties. Others, however, brought a different challenge
to empirical psychology,279 a challenge that culminated in Freud’s
revolutionary effort to penetrate the empirical surface of conscious-
ness and behavior in order to reach the region of unconscious
fantasies and irrational desires beyond.280 Holmes wrote his most
important philosophical works before Freud published The
Interpretation of Dreams in 1899, but Holmes’s view of human nature
had strong overtones of the Romantic attitude that, in its secularized
version,281 would provide strong intellectual impetus for Freudian
psychoanalytic psychology. Writing in the last four decades of the
nineteenth century, Holmes expressed an ambivalence about
empirical psychology that mirrored the despair many felt over the
Enlightenment effort to reduce mind to its logical and material
elements,282 a despair first and most eloquently voiced by the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century Romantic poets and
philosophers.
278. See supra Part II.
279. See ELLENBERGER, supra note 102, at 110-81 (discussing mesmerism and hypnotism,
including the work of Charcot and Bernheim).
280. See GAY, FREUD, supra note 119, at 119 (“Freud developed his program within the
framework of contemporary psychology, but broke through that framework at point after
decisive point.”).
281. See SUZANNE R. KIRSCHNER, THE RELIGIOUS AND ROMANTIC ORIGINS OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS 150-78 (1996).
282. See supra notes 142-55 and accompanying text; infra note 284 and accompanying text.
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“Romanticism” is a notoriously ambiguous word, and its mean-
ing as used in this Article is intentionally broad. Arthur Lovejoy
argued over half a century ago that there was not one Romanticism,
but several different Romanticisms with varied and conflicting
themes.283 Keeping in mind the danger of reducing such a broad range
of philosophical and literary work to a single genre, the following
generalizations will be made about the constellation of ideas
associated with the term “Romantic.” In Germany and England in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Romanticism
arose in rebellion against the Enlightenment faith in reason and
science as illuminating the path of social progress.284 The Romantic
attitude toward human nature varied over time and among different
writers, but its essential features included: (1) the supplementation of
empirical knowledge with knowledge gained through intuition or
imagination; (2) the focus on subjective experience or “inwardness”;
(3) the emphasis on the limitations of intellect and reason; (4) the
idea of conflict as inherent in human nature; (5) the acceptance, and
even celebration, of the irrational; and (6) the view of nature as the
283. See Arthur O. Lovejoy, On the Discrimination of Romanticisms, in ESSAYS IN THE
HISTORY OF IDEAS 228, 232 (1948) (“The word ‘romantic’ has come to mean so many things
that, by itself, it means nothing. It has ceased to perform the function of a verbal sign.”); see
also TAYLOR, supra note 143, at 368 (referring to “romanticism” as a “conceptual muddle”).
Lovejoy’s view has not been accepted by those scholars who prefer a more loosely-defined use
of the word. See, e.g., E.D. HIRSCH, JR., WORDSWORTH AND SCHELLING: A TYPOLOGICAL
STUDY OF ROMANTICISM 2-3 (1971); TAYLOR, supra note 143, at 368-69. The cultural historian
M.H. Abrams, for example, uses the word
as an expository convenience to specify . . . “some of the striking parallels, in
authorial stance and persona, subject matter, ideas, values, imagery, forms of thought
and imagination, and design of plot or structure” which are manifested in a great
many important English and German writers, in a great variety of literary, philo-
sophical, and historical forms, during those three or four decades after the outbreak
of the French Revolution which, following common historical usage, I call the Ro-
mantic era . . . .
M.H. Abrams, Rationality and Imagination in Cultural History: A Reply to Wayne Booth,
CRITICAL INQUIRY, Spr. 1976, 447, 450-51 (quoting M.H. ABRAMS, NATURAL SUPER-
NATURALISM 11-12 (1971)). Others have joined Abrams in repudiating the effort to define
“Romanticism” with greater precision and in utilizing the word in self-consciously general
terms. In their anthology of Romanticism, Harold Bloom and Lionel Trilling come to the
sensible conclusion that “[t]he discrimination between Romanticisms generally ends in a
hopeless jumble, and none will be attempted here.” HAROLD BLOOM & LIONEL TRILLING,
Romantic Poetry, in ROMANTIC POETRY AND PROSE 3, 4 (Harold Bloom & Lionel Trilling
eds., 1973); see also KIRSCHNER, supra note 281, at 153-58 (agreeing with Abrams’s resistance
to any effort to define “Romanticism” more precisely).
284. See 2 PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION—THE SCIENCE OF
FREEDOM 98-125 (1969); KIRSCHNER, supra note 281, at 150-53. Kirschner observes that Peter
Gay has pointed out that the philosophes “were not as simplistically optimistic about the nature
and effects of progress as is sometimes alleged.” Id. at 151.
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inner source of transcendent meaning in the universe.285 The
Romantic writers were, in varying guises and to varying degrees,
opposed to the mechanistic and reductionist approach of the
empirical psychologists who sought to apply the methods and laws of
the natural sciences to the human mind.286 The high Romantics were
dismayed by what they viewed as the disenchantment of the world
brought about by the rationalist-empiricist ideals of the Enlighten-
ment. “Against the classical stress on rationalism, tradition, and
formal harmony, the Romantics affirmed the rights of the individual,
of the imagination, and of feeling.”287 Unlike the Enlightenment
philosophes, who considered irrationalism a dark enemy to be
vanquished by the light of reason, the Romantics typically
proclaimed the need to integrate the irrational with the consciously
rational elements in human nature.288
What most distinguished Romantic psychology from empirical
schools of thought was its insistence on the importance of the
inwardness of experience,289 of insight, and of imagination. This
aspect of Romanticism had roots in Kant’s conception of innate
mental faculties. According to Kant, the mind is possessed of
intuitive faculties such as causality, substance, necessity and existence
that give order and meaning to knowledge gained through
experience.290 For Kant, “[t]he term ‘transcendental’ designated the
285. This loose definition has been derived primarily from the following studies of
Romanticism: M.H. ABRAMS, NATURAL SUPERNATURALISM, supra note 283; ISAIAH BERLIN,
THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (Henry Hardy
ed., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1991) (1990); BLOOM & TRILLING, supra note 283; 4 PETER GAY,
THE BOURGEOIS EXPERIENCE—VICTORIA TO FREUD; THE NAKED HEART (1995)
[hereinafter GAY, THE NAKED HEART]; KIRSCHNER, supra note 281, at 149-66; TAYLOR,
supra note 143; ROMANTICISM AND CONSCIOUSNESS (Harold Bloom ed., 1970); M.H. Abrams,
English Romanticism: The Spirit of the Age, in ROMANTICISM AND CONSCIOUSNESS, supra, at
90 [hereinafter, Abrams, English Romanticism]; Lovejoy, supra note 283.
286. See WALTER JACKSON BATE, FROM CLASSIC TO ROMANTIC: PREMISES OF TASTE IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 129 (1946):
It is an ironic commonplace of intellectual history that one of the major sources of
the romantic stress on feeling was ultimately the mechanistic psychology of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Empiricism, having disposed of the mind as a
strictly rational instrument, was increasingly forced to fall back on the immediate
feeling of the individual.
287. TAYLOR, supra note 143, at 368.
288. See KIRSCHNER, supra note 281, at 151 n.4.
289. See PAUL ROAZEN, FREUD: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THOUGHT 55 (1968).
290. See KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 144, at 65-91, 102-119; IMMANUEL
KANT, ANTHROPOLOGY FROM A PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW 9-97 (Mary J. Gregor trans.,
Martinus Nijhoff 1974) (1797).
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fundamental conceptions, the universal and necessary judgments,
which transcend the sphere of experience, and at the same time
impose the conditions that make experience tributary to knowl-
edge.”291 Kant’s transcendental psychology—his view of mind as
possessing a priori forms of knowledge292—greatly influenced the
psychological ideas of later German Romantics such as Johann
Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling.293 Fichte
promoted a form of absolute idealism that posited will as the ultimate
source of meaning, whereas Schelling emphasized the primacy of
creative imagination and the union of subjective self with objective
nature.
Few nineteenth-century Americans actually struggled to master
the works of the German philosophers,294 but educated Americans
were acquainted with their ideas through the literary writings of the
German novelists and English poets and writers. Along with Fichte
and Schelling, Goethe is the most widely known of the German
Romantics; Wordsworth, Coleridge and Carlyle are the best known
of the English literary Romantics from this period.295 The ideas of the
German Romantics were also made known in the United States
through the work of Ralph Waldo Emerson and the American
Transcendentalists, who studied Kant, Fichte and Goethe in addition
to the English Romantics.296 As expressed in the work of these
writers, Romantic psychology emphasized intuitive and imaginative
faculties, the mind in action, innate and conflicting instinctual drives,
and the “chaos” of emotional irrationality that occasionally bordered
on madness. The psychology of Romanticism extolled mind as
dynamic, expressive, dualist, creative, regressive, instinctual,
transcendent and, although often captured in the beauty of verse,
depraved and driven to despair.
Through his early studies, the education received from his father,
and the intellectual circles he traveled in, Holmes—like most
educated Americans—was well-versed in the literature of European
291. OCTAVIUS BROOKS FROTHINGHAM, TRANSCENDENTALISM IN NEW ENGLAND: A
HISTORY 12-13 (Univ. of Penn. Press 1959) (1876).
292. For a recent discussion of Kant’s psychology, see KITCHER, supra note 144.
293. See GARDNER MURPHY & JOSEPH KOVACH, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO
MODERN PSYCHOLOGY 45-46 (3d ed. 1972).
294. See FROTHINGHAM, supra note 291, at 51-52.
295. This list does not begin to do justice to the European Romantic writers, among whom
could be included William Blake, Rousseau, Shelley, Keats, Byron and Nietzsche.
296. See ENGELL, supra note 21, at 188-89.
DAILEY TO PRINTER ON MARCH 11 1999 03/13/99 9:59 PM
490 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:429
Romanticism and American Transcendentalism. Holmes’s personal
affection for Emerson is well known.297 His reading list and writings
from his early years reveal that he was especially familiar with the
works of Goethe,298 Carlyle,299 and Coleridge.300 At Harvard as an
undergraduate, Holmes twice withdrew from the library Modern
Philosophy by Victor Cousin,301 whose idealism exerted a strong
influence on American Transcendentalism.302 During his college years
Holmes read Fichte’s Contribution to Mental Philosophy303 and his
earliest writings expressed a youthful idealism.304 Contrary to the
prevailing view, his interest in the Romantic writers did not end in
youth:305 his reading list records that throughout the 1880s and 1890s
Holmes repeatedly read Shelley,306 Keats,307 Carlyle,308 Goethe,309
Wordsworth,310 and Coleridge.311 Although in adulthood Holmes
openly defected from the religious idealism of his father’s
generation,312 his conversion to the secular faith of science was never
complete. Despite his interest in evolutionary and scientific ideas,
Holmes never lost the sense of the mystery of the universe and the
longing for human connectedness—“the oceanic feeling of awe, in
Freud’s terms”—that define the essence of religious (and Romantic)
297. See Hoffheimer, supra note 31, at 1227.
298. See Little, supra note 12, at 170 (Faust 1865), 190 (Faust, in German, 1875).
299. See id. at 188 (Sartor Resartus 1874).
300. See id. at 190 (1875); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Notes on Albert Durer, 7
HARV. MAG. 41, 45 (1860), reprinted in 1 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 153, 155
[hereinafter Notes on Albert Durer] (discussing Coleridge’s criticism of English poets).
301. See HOWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 31, at 53.
302. See COPLESTON, supra note 205, at 262.
303. See HOWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 31, at 53.
304. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Books, 4 HARV. MAG. 408 (1858), reprinted in 1
COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 139; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Plato, 2 U.Q. 205
(1860), reprinted in 1 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 145; Notes on Albert Durer, supra
note 300, at 41, reprinted in 1 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 153. See also, Hoffheimer,
supra note 31 at 1225-28 (discussing idealism in Holmes’s earliest works).
305. See Hoffheimer, supra note 31 at 1227-28.
306. See Notes of Howe, Holmes’s Reading List, supra note 16, at Year 1894.
307. See id. at Year 1882
308. See id. at Year 1884.
309. See id. at Years 1885, 1898, 1899.
310. See id. at Years 1887, 1889 (aloud).
311. See id. at Year 1900.
312. See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Morris Cohen (Feb. 5, 1919), quoted in
NOVICK, supra note 141, at 412 n.11 (“My father . . . . [and] the rest of his generation
[possessed] a certain softness of attitude toward the interstitial miracle . . . that I did not feel.”);
Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, supra note 23, at 533-35.
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experience.313 Holmes continued late in life, as he would say in a
letter to James, to “sympathize deeply” with the aim of “justif[ying]
the idealizing impulse.”314
Notwithstanding his own “soldier’s faith,”315 Holmes remained
skeptical about religious dogma,316 and for that reason this Article
refers to Holmes’s psychology as Romantic rather than Transcenden-
talist. The American Transcendentalists retained a religious outlook
that was less dominant in the work of European Romanticism,
particularly in the literary form that seems to have influenced
Holmes the most. This is not to say that religious meaning was
lacking from nineteenth-century Romantic thinking, nor, for that
matter, from Holmes’s philosophy either. To the contrary, many
Romantics saw the natural order in Christian terms; M. H. Abrams
has described the Romantics as attempting “in diverse degrees and
ways, to naturalize the supernatural and to humanize the divine.”317
313. PETER GAY, A GODLESS JEW: FREUD, ATHEISM, AND THE MAKING OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS 16 (1987). In descriptive terms that come eerily close to Freud’s, Holmes
said in 1891:
Somebody once said to me, “After all, religion is the only interesting thing,” and
I think it is true if you take the word a little broadly, and include under it the pas-
sionate curiosity as well as the passionate awe which we feel in face of the mystery of
the universe. This curiosity is the most human appetite we have. We alone of living
beings yearn to get a little nearer and ever a little nearer toward the unseen ocean
into which pours the stream of things,—toward the reality of the phantasmagoria
which dance before our eyes for threescore years and ten.
The Use of Colleges, supra note 34, at 483.
314. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to William James (May 24, 1896), in 2 RALPH
BARTON PERRY, THE THOUGHT AND CHARACTER OF WILLIAM JAMES 458 (Greenwood Press
1974) (1935); see also Hoffheimer, supra note 31, at 1227 (“[Holmes’s] mature writings did not
reject totally the transcendentalism of his early work; even at the end of his life he continued to
admire Emerson.”).
315. The Soldier’s Faith, supra note 34, at 486. For discussion of Holmes’s Soldier’s Faith, its
element of inner transcendence, and its connection to Romanticism, see infra notes 352-55 and
accompanying text.
316. In a typical expression of his views toward religion, Holmes wrote to Lewis Einstein in
1909:
[William James] is eternally trying to get devout conclusions from sceptical premises,
which I think very possible, but I think he takes the wrong road. He believes in
miracles if you will turn down the lights . . . . I think scepticism should be humble and
be content with saying the universe has consciousness, significance, etc. inside of it,
for it has us; but the chances are that it transcends them in some unimaginable way.
All of which no doubt I have said before twenty times.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Lewis Einstein (Sept. 27, 1909), in THE HOLMES-
EINSTEIN LETTERS, supra note 118, at 52-53.
317. ABRAMS, NATURAL SUPERNATURALISM, supra note 283, at 68; see also KIRSCHNER,
supra note 281, at 149 (placing Romantic thinking “in the context of other secular systems that
have been influenced by Biblical history and inner light mysticism”).
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Eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century Romantics, like Holmes,
still recognized the universal meaning underlying the apparent chaos
of nature and mind, although access to this universal meaning was
increasingly had through subjective experience.318 Nevertheless, the
connection between Transcendental philosophy and New England
Unitarianism was more direct than that between Christian doctrine
and Romanticism; Emerson, the most influential of the American
Transcendentalists and certainly the one closest to Holmes next to his
own father, was at one time a Unitarian minister.319 Although
Emerson’s influence on the young Holmes was great, and Holmes
himself acknowledged in later years that it was “Emerson [who] set
me on fire,”320 it was possibly, and perhaps likely, the strong religious
overtones to American Transcendentalism that distanced Holmes
from Emerson’s views. However much he admired Emerson, the
latter, like William James,321 was primarily engaged in speculative
thought for religious ends. For many Romantics, in contrast, nature
rather than God served to provide a transcendent source of meaning
in the world.
“Romantic” seems an apt term for Holmes’s psychology for
another reason as well. Holmes’s dissatisfaction with empirical
psychology was part of the reaction against reason and rationality
begun by Romantic observers of human nature. In this respect,
Holmes’s originality lay in his application of the ideas of a
subordinate, and even subversive, philosophical tradition to the study
of the law. He did not follow through on the radical implications of
Romantic psychology for law reform;322 the best he could do was to
318. “The source of unity and wholeness which Augustine found only in God is now to be
discovered within the self.” TAYLOR, supra note 143, at 362.
319. See COPLESTON, supra note 205, at 262.
320. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to John T. Morse, Jr. (Nov. 8, 1926), quoted in
HOWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 31, at 54. When Holmes finished his essay on Primitive
Notions in Modern Law, which would eventually constitute the first chapter of The Common
Law, he sent it to Emerson. See HOWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 31, at 203 & n.61.
321. See, e.g., JAMES, VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE, supra note 195 (collecting
lectures on religious questions such as “The Value of Saintliness” and “The Religion of
Healthy-Mindedness”).
322. The implications of unconscious motivations and irrationality for common law doctrine
in the areas of criminal law, contracts, and torts, as well as constitutional doctrine in the areas
of freedom of speech and economic liberty, were obviously far-reaching. Although Holmes
maintained a lifelong appreciation for the unconscious, see infra text accompanying note 380, it
was later thinkers, like Jerome Frank and Harold Lasswell, who would explore the implications
of psychoanalytic ideas in law and politics, see, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND (1930); HAROLD D. LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS (1930).
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advocate an external standard of liability that sidestepped the
question of rationality and motivation altogether. But the Romantic
themes of inwardness, unconscious passions, inner conflict,
irrationality and secular transcendence in Holmes’s work—the
essence of his psychology and the foundation for his vision of heroism
in law—he left for future generations to explore.
B. Seeing Through the Heart and Will
Four months after Holmes had written to William James in
Germany about his unsolved problems with vis viva, his next letter to
James burst “like a meteor into the sphere of a planet.”323 Written in
the early spring of 1868,324 Holmes’s letter is worth quoting at length:
Dear Bill,—
The icy teeth have melted out of the air and winter has snapped
at us for the last time. Now are the waters beneath my window of a
deeper and more significant blue than heretofore. Now do the fields
burn with green fire—the evanescent hint of I know not what hidden
longing of the earth. Now all the bushes burgeon with wooly buds
and the elm trees have put on bridal veils of hazy brown. Now to the
chorus of the frogs answers the chorus of the birds in antiphony of
morning and evening. Now couples, walking round Boston Common
Sundays after sunset, draw near to each other in the dark spaces
between the gas lights and think themselves unseen. . . . Spring is
here, Bill, and I turn to thee,—not with more affection than during
the long grind of the winter, but desiring if it may be to say a word to
thee once more.
Since I wrote in December I have worked at nothing but the law.
Philosophy has hibernated in torpid slumber, and I have lain
“sluttishly soaking and gurgling in the devil’s pickle,” as Carlyle
says. It has been necessary,—if a man chooses a profession he can-
not forever content himself in picking out the plums with fastidious
dilettantism and give the rest of the loaf to the poor, but must eat his
way manfully through crust and crumb—soft, unpleasant, inner parts
which, within one, swell, causing discomfort in the bowels. Such has
323. Letter from William James to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (May 15, 1868), quoted in
PERRY, supra note 1, at 93.
324. Holmes had received his degree from Harvard Law School and was serving as an
apprentice in the Boston law firm Chandler, Shattuck & Thayer. See HOWE, SHAPING YEARS,
supra note 31, at 245.
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been my cowardice that I have been almost glad that you weren’t
here, lest you should be disgusted to find me inaccessible to ideas
and impressions of more spiritual significance but alien to my stud-
ies. Think not, however, that I distrust the long enduring of your
patience. I know that you would be the last of all to turn away from
one in whom you discerned the possibility of friendship because his
vigils were at a different shrine, knowing it was the same Divinity he
worshipped. And the winter has been a success, I think, both for the
simple discipline of the work and because I now go on with an ever
increasing conviction that law as well as any other series of facts in
this world may be approached in the interests of science and may be
studied, yes and practised, with the preservation of one’s ideals. . . .
To finish the search of mankind, to discover the ne plus ultra which
is the demand of ingenuous youth, one finds is not allotted to an
individual. To reconcile oneself to life—to dimly apprehend that this
dream disturbing the sleep of the cosm is not the result of a dys-
pepsy, but is well—to suspect some of the divine harmonies, though
you cannot note them like a score of music—these things, methinks,
furnish vanishing points which give a kind of perspective to the
chaos of events. . . .
. . . .
. . . There is a new fire in the earth and sky. . . . I feel the mighty
quickening of the spring.
The larches have sprouted.
I saw a butterfly today just loosed from the bondage of winter,
and a bee toiling in sticky buds half opened.
O! passionate breezes! O! rejoicing hills! How swells the soft full
chorus—for this earth which slept has awakened, and the air is
tremulous with multiplied joyous sound.
Sing, sparrow—kissing with thy feet the topmost tassels of the
pines.
Cease not thy too much sound, O! robin. Squirrels grind thy scis-
sors in the woods, Creak, blackbirds. Croak, frogs, Caw, high-flying
crows, who have seen the breaking of the ice in northern rivers and
the seaward moving booms.
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A keen, slender, stridulous vibration—almost too fine for the
hearing, weaving in and out, and in the pauses of the music dividing
the silence like a knife—pierces my heart with an ecstasy I cannot
utter. Ah! what is it? Did I ever hear it? Is it a voice within, answer-
ing to the others, but different from them—and like a singing flame
not ceasing with that which made it vocal?
Dear Bill, to whom should I vent this madness but to you?325
Holmes need not be placed squarely among the Romantics for
us to see their undeniable influence on him. As James remarked in
reply, the letter “runs through the whole circle of human energy,
Shelley, Kant, Goethe, Walt Whitman, all being fused in the unity of
your fiery personality.”326 For Romantics like Schelling, whose
naturphilosophie directly influenced English Romantics such as
Coleridge,327 nature symbolized the source of the individual’s sense of
oneness with the world.328 Holmes read the work of Coleridge and
referred to him in an early essay;329 it is also possible, if not likely, that
Holmes read the famous essay on Coleridge by John Stuart Mill330
describing Coleridge’s concept of intuitive knowledge that transcends
the senses. In language reminiscent of the view of nature taken by
Coleridge and the English poets, Holmes describes fields as
“burn[ing] with green fire—the evanescent hint of I know not what
hidden longing of the earth;” “a new fire in the earth and sky;” “a
voice within, answering to the others, but different from them—and
like a singing flame not ceasing with that which made it vocal.” The
symbol of the flame and the description of nature in such ecstatic,
secular and transcendent terms carry the distinct mark of Romanti-
cism.331
325. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to William James (Apr. 19, 1868), quoted in
PERRY, supra note 1, at 92-93.
326. Id. at 93-94.
327. See Introduction, in S. T. COLERIDGE, 1 BIOGRAPHIA LITERARIA at lx-lxxii (J.
Shawcross ed., 1907). Surprisingly, Coleridge at one time expressed his belief in associationist
psychology. See COPLESTON, supra note 205, at 151.
328. See TAYLOR, supra note 143, at 371.
329. See Notes on Albert Durer, supra note 300, at 45, reprinted in 1 COLLECTED WORKS,
supra note 3, at 155.
330. See JOHN STUART MILL, Coleridge, in 1 DISSERTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 405
(London, Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer 3d ed., 1875).
331. See TAYLOR, supra note 143, at 374. It is no coincidence that, confessing that he had
“worked at nothing but the law” all winter, Holmes deferred to Carlyle, the great Romantic
essayist, for the reference to legal study as “the devil’s pickle.” Letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. to William James (Apr. 19, 1868), quoted in PERRY, supra note 1, at 92.
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Holmes’s letter offers the flame as a symbol for “a voice within”
which is indistinguishable from the voice of nature.332 What Holmes
developed here was a particular Romantic view that Charles Taylor
has called “expressivist”: the idea of nature as an inner source of
meaning.333 Unlike the earlier religious view of nature as a reflection
of divine order, the Romantic conception viewed nature “as an inner
impulse or conviction which tells us of the importance of our own
natural fulfillment and of solidarity with our fellow creatures in
theirs.”334 Nature as experienced subjectively provided access to the
deepest truths and connected the individual to a universal meaning; it
expressed the universal through the particular, an attitude that
Holmes would apply to himself many years later.335
At the time Holmes wrote his letter to James, his effort to step
away from an objectively given divine order in the direction of a
subjective and naturalized conception of meaning in the universe
represented a radical break with orthodoxy. This break with
orthodoxy had a strong psychological dimension to the extent that
the subjective contemplation of nature required the mental faculty of
creative imagination. The “imaginative impulse” Holmes found
lacking in Alexander Bain336 was tied to this Romantic vision of the
mind’s creative power to seize meaning from the world in intuitive
and imaginative ways. The imaginative faculty was what endowed the
individual with the power to grasp meaning in nature, and it is
therefore not surprising that the ideal of the creative artist became
the Romantic equivalent of the Creator.337 Although the Romantic
imagination for some writers bordered on madness,338 for most the
332. TAYLOR, supra note 143, at 357-58 (describing Rousseau’s work in which “nature is
likened to a voice within”).
333. See id. at 368.
334. Id. at 369-70.
335. See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Dr. Wu (June 16, 1923), reprinted in
JUSTICE HOLMES TO DOCTOR WU, supra note 122, at 13.
336. See supra text accompanying note 230.
337. See TAYLOR, supra note 143, at 378 (quoting Herder for the idea that “[t]he artist is
become a creator God”).
338. See BERLIN, supra note 285, at 233-34. The Romantic attack upon the world of
appearances cleared the way
for Schopenhauer’s world tossed hither and thither by a blind, aimless, cosmic will,
for Dostoevsky’s underground man, and Kafka’s lucid nightmares, for Nietzsche’s
evocation of the Kraftmenschen condemned in Plato’s dialogues—Thrasymachus, or
Callicles—who see no reason against sweeping aside the cobwebs of laws and con-
ventions if they obstruct their will to power, for Baudelaire’s “Enivrez-vous sans
cesse!”
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intuitive power represented a higher, but supplemental, power of
perception. For Holmes this power was still linked to the idea of a
cosmic plan or design, but the power of creative imagination would
evolve in the twentieth century into the individual’s need to make,
rather than find, meaning in the world. The belief in the inwardness
of experience, which included the opacity and conflict of human
motivations, was central to the Romantic movement and is also what
serves to relate Holmes’s thought to the development of modern
notions of self and subjectivity. The emphasis on inner expression as
opposed to objective perception was the first step in the development
of modern notions of privacy and autonomy,339 notions that have
come to play such a significant role in the law.
For Holmes, as for the Romantics, the process of imaginative
perception operated indirectly, or as Holmes was fond of saying, by
way of a “glimpse” or “hint” or an “echo”340 of some inaccessible and
unfathomable meaning.341 As already discussed, Holmes, like the
Romantics, regarded reason as a valuable but insufficient tool for
understanding the world. Some Romantics were skeptical of analytic
                                                                                                                                     
Id.
339. See TAYLOR, supra note 143, at 375. Peter Gay draws the connection between the
recognition of “the elemental power of passionate desires” in human nature and the rise of
inwardness and self-reflection that marked the nineteenth century:
For centuries, . . . as such names as Plato and Saint Augustine and Montaigne attest,
men had probed the workings of the passions in their inner lives. . . . The nineteenth
century was the psychological century par excellence. It was a time when confes-
sional autobiographies, informal self-portraits, self-referential novels, intimate dia-
ries and secret journals, grew from a trickle to a stream, and when their display of
subjectivity, their purposeful inwardness, markedly intensified. What Rousseau in his
painfully frank Confessions and the young Goethe in his self-lacerating and self-
liberating Sorrows of Young Werther had sown in the eighteenth century, the decades
of Byron and Stendhal, of Nietzsche and William James, reaped in the nineteenth.
Thomas Carlyle perceptively spoke of “these Autobiographical times of ours.” But
this modern preoccupation with the self was no by means pure gain. “The key to the
period,” Ralph Waldo Emerson said late in life, “seemed to be that the mind had
become aware of itself.” With the “new consciousness,” he thought, “the young men
were born with knives in their brain, a tendency to introversion, self-dissection,
anatomizing of motives.” It was an age of Hamlets.
GAY, FREUD, supra note 119, at 129 (quoting THOMAS CARLYLE, SARTOR RESARTUS, book
II, ch. 2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, quoted in JEROME HAMILTON BUCKLEY, THE TURNING KEY:
AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND THE SUBJECTIVE IMPULSE SINCE 1800, at 4 (1984)).
340. See The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 478, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS,
supra note 3, at 406.
341. American Transcendentalists were described by F.O. Matthiessen in similar terms, as
believing that “reality could be caught only tangentially, and conveyed obliquely.” ROAZEN,
supra note 289, at 52 (quoting F. O. MATTHIESSEN, AMERICAN RENAISSANCE 57-58 (1941)).
In the words of Emerson, “Everything in the universe goes by indirection.” Id. (quoting Ralph
Waldo Emerson, quoted in MATTHIESSEN, supra, at 57-58).
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reasoning altogether, a position most famously captured by
Wordsworth’s poem “The Tables Turned”:
Sweet is the lore which Nature brings;
Our meddling intellect
Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things:
We murder to dissect.342
Holmes’s skepticism about empirical psychology came closer to
the views of Romantic writers such as Coleridge, who believed that
“scientific and critical understanding” needed to be supplemented,
rather than displaced altogether, by “intuitive reason.”343 For Holmes
as for the Romantics, natural science and empirical methods were but
a point of departure for the intuitive process that reveals the deeper
meaning immanent in subjective experience. Schelling, too,
considered science “nothing but a collection of facts”344 in need of
completion by the imaginative powers. Holmes’s broad enthusiasm
for scientific empiricism and the project he called “the rational study
of law” suggest the extent to which he found reason a useful tool in
understanding the world: he was in many, if not most, ways a child of
the Enlightenment. But he was an unruly child with respect to his
ideas about human nature, a domain where Holmes found the direct
rational methods of scientific observation insufficient. Holmes
explained in a speech to the Bar Association of Boston in 1900:
We all are very near despair. The sheathing that floats us over its
waves is compounded of hope, faith in the unexplainable worth and
sure issue of effort, and the deep, sub-conscious content which comes
from the exercise of our powers.345
342. William Wordsworth, The Tables Turned, reprinted in ROMANTIC POETRY AND
PROSE, supra note 283, at 129.
343. COPLESTON, supra note 205, at 152; see also BERLIN, supra note 285, at 234 (“Neither
Hoffman nor Tieck sets out . . . to deny the truths of science, or even those of common sense, at
their own level—that is, as categories required for limited purposes, medical or technological or
commercial.”).
344. Leary, German Idealism, supra note 152, at 301.
345. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Speech Before the Bar Association of Boston (Mar. 7,
1900), in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 498, 500 (emphasis added).
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Holmes’s theory of the unconscious reflected a Romantic view of
the inability of scientific thought to comprehend the hidden and
chaotic depths of subjective life.346
The idea of conflict as an essential element in human nature also
tied Holmes’s thinking to Romanticism. The Romantics were
notoriously attached to the psychological idea of a fundamental
opposition between good and evil. Charles Taylor describes the
Romantics’ “resistance to a one-dimensional picture of the will and
their recovery of the sense that good and evil are in conflict in the
human breast.”347 The celebration of human greatness and depravity
were deeply interconnected: if anything, the Romantics had a
tendency to overindulge their affection for the base in human nature.
Holmes’s “bad man” could be viewed in these terms, as a recognition
of the potential for moral depravity lurking in every law-abiding
citizen’s breast, but the depiction of the instinct for revenge that runs
throughout The Common Law more fully captures Holmes’s view of
the conflicting drives that constitute human nature at the most
primitive and unconscious levels. Romanticism is often associated
with periods of political upheaval,348 a fact that recalls Holmes’s Civil
War experience. Critics Harold Bloom and Lionel Trilling have
commented that Romanticism “is the literary form of the Revolution,
which began in America and the West Indies, flowered in France, and
spread from France through space and time into the continuing world
upheaval of our century.”349 Traditional histories date the beginning
of Romanticism with the French Revolution and associate the spirit
of Romanticism with radical rebellion of political, philosophical,
artistic and psychological sorts.350 Without venturing too far into
346. See TAYLOR, supra note 143, at 380 (“The old idea of a rationally evident harmony of
natures gives way to a new one of a current of love or life, which is both close to us and baffles
understanding.”). The Romantic conception of hidden emotions and conflicts—referred to as
“chaos”—has been understood by some commentators as later giving rise to psychodynamic
theories of the unconscious. See Madeleine Vermorel & Henri Vermorel, Was Freud a
Romantic?, 13 INT’L REV. PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 15, 20 (1986) (discussing Freud’s view of the
unconscious in relation to the ideas of the Romantics).
347. TAYLOR, supra note 143, at 355.
348. See, e.g., Abrams, English Romanticism, supra note 285, at 91-92.
349. BLOOM & TRILLING, supra note 283, at 5.
350. See Alfred Cobban, The Revolt Against the Eighteenth Century, in ROMANTICISM AND
CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note 285, at 133:
Now to be in revolt against [the eighteenth] century was essentially to be in revolt
against a theory of the mind—that superficial psychology of sensations [i.e., Associa-
tionism] . . . It is in their revolt against the psychological school founded by Locke
that Burke, Rousseau and Kant find a principle of union, and it would not be untrue
to say that they were all three inspired less by the scientific weakness of this theory
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biographical speculation, it may be that Holmes’s Civil War
experience helped to inform his Romantic view of human nature.
Holmes was no rebel, to be sure, and he fought valiantly on the side
of the Union. Yet for all his seeming intellectual skepticism and
emotional detachment, Holmes’s experience in war seemed to bring
him into touch with the raw antinomies of good and evil lying
beneath the surface of conscious awareness and rational intellect.
Recalling his close brush with death during the war, Holmes
wrote about his contemplation of a “deathbed recantation” of his
unbelief:
Besides, thought I, can I recant if I want to, has the approach of
death changed my beliefs much? & to this I answered—No. Then
came in my Philosophy—I am to take a leap in the dark—but now as
ever I believe that whatever shall happen is best—for it is in accor-
dance with a general law—and good & universal (or general law) are
synonymous terms in the universe. (I can now add that our phrase
good only means certain general truths seen through the heart & will
instead of being merely contemplated intellectually. I doubt if the
intellect accepts or recognizes that classification of good and bad).351
In this brief account, we find a clear presentation of one of the
central tenets of Romantic philosophy: that truth comes to the
individual “through the heart & will” rather than being “merely
contemplated intellectually.” Holmes referred to his version of
Romantic philosophy as “the soldier’s faith,”352 a divine message that
arises from the subjective confrontation with death:353
I do not know what is true. I do not know the meaning of the
universe. But in the midst of doubt, in the collapse of creeds, there is
one thing I do not doubt, that no man who lives in the same world
with most of us can doubt, and that is that the faith is true and ador-
able which leads a soldier to throw away his life in obedience to a
blindly accepted duty, in a cause which he little understands, in a
plan of campaign of which he has no notion, under tactics of which
he does not see the use . . . .
                                                                                                                                     
than by its inability to satisfy the eternal demand of the human spirit for a sense of
reality.
351. Civil War Diary of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., quoted in HOWE, SHAPING YEARS,
supra note 31, at 105-06.
352. The Soldier’s Faith, supra note 34, at 490.
353. And perhaps also, in Holmes’s view, from the experience of motherhood: “The ideals
of the past for men have drawn from war, as those for women have been drawn from
motherhood.” Id. at 487.
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 . . . If, in short, as some, I hope many, who hear me, have known,
you have known the vicissitudes of terror and of triumph in war, you
know that there is such a thing as the faith I spoke of. You know
your own weakness and are modest; but you know that man has in
him that unspeakable somewhat which makes him capable of miracle,
able to lift himself by the might of his own soul, unaided, able to face
annihilation for a blind belief.354
The image of the soldier symbolizes the transcendent element in
Holmes’s psychology: the innate “unspeakable somewhat”—the
“flame” that burns within—whose worldly form is heroism and whose
spiritual nature connects the individual to a universal meaning.355
A final link between Holmes’s Civil War experience and his
Romantic outlook on human nature was his poetic writing from that
period in his life. Both the choice of expressive form—the poetic
verse—as well as the content of the expression resonate deeply with
the Romantic temper. M. H. Abrams describes “the recurrent
emotional pattern” in which poems “turn on the theme of hope and
joy and the temptation to abandon all hope and fall into dejection
and despair.”356 In a poem for Henry Abbott who died in the war,
Holmes took up this theme:
H.L.A.
Twentieth Massachusetts Volunteers
He steered unquestioning nor turning back,
Into the darkness and the unknown sea;
He vanished in the starless night, and we
Saw but the shining of his luminous wake.
Thou sawest light, but ah, our sky seemed black,
And all too hard the inscrutable decree.
354. Id. at 487-88.
355. In a speech given at the 50th anniversary of the graduation of Harvard’s class of 1861,
Holmes concluded with these words:
Life is a roar of bargain and battle, but in the very heart of it there rises a mystic
spiritual tone that gives meaning to the whole. It transmutes the dull details into
romance. It reminds us that our only but wholly adequate significance is as parts of
the unimaginable whole. It suggests that even while we think that we are egotists we
are living to ends outside ourselves.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Address before the Class of 1861 on the Fiftieth Anniversary of its
Graduation (June 28, 1911), in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 504, 505.
356. Abrams, English Romanticism, supra note 285, at 108.
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Yet, noble heart, full soon we follow thee,
Lit by the deeds that flamed along thy track.
Nay, art thou hid in darkness, shall we say,
Or rather whisper with untrembling lips;
We see thee not, yet trust thou art not far,
But passing onward from this life’s eclipse
Hast vanished only as the morning star,
Into the glory of the perfect day.357
We can also hear the poetic quest in the lines of the letter
Holmes wrote to James in the spring of 1868.358 Given the emotional
detachment that characterizes many of Holmes’s later judicial
decisions, we often forget that Holmes was an occasional poet whose
Romantic vision survived—admittedly in scaled-down form—in his
view of human nature.359 The Romantic in Holmes could be, and
often was, overshadowed by his own clear enthusiasm for the rational
study of law and for the usefulness of the empirical social sciences.
Nevertheless, the usefulness of science had limitations for Holmes.
He took comfort in the symbol of the soldier because he believed
that the subjective faith which moves individuals to heroism and
connects the individual to the universe arises in the active
confrontation with the possibility of one’s own death—or the pursuit
of “dangerous action,” as he called it. The following discussion
explores Holmes’s idea of “dangerous action” and its connection to
the Romantic psychology that underlies his ideal of heroism in the
law.
C. Heroism in the Law
The concept of mental activity was a source of heated debate
within nineteenth-century psychology. For associationist psycholo-
gists, mental activity was understood, when it was acknowledged at
all, as akin to chemistry and thus as explainable in terms of
physiological stimuli and mechanical processes. In reaction to the
357. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., H.L.A., EVENING TRANSCRIPT (Boston), Oct. 17, 1864, at
2, reprinted in HOWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 31, at 165.
358. See supra text accompanying note 325.
359. Holmes’s other published poems were Alma Mater, 7 HARV. MAG. 48 (1860),
reprinted in 1 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 157, and How Fought Our Brothers,
HARVARD COLLEGE CLASS OF 1861, FIRST TRIENNIAL REPORT (Cambridge, privately printed
1864), reprinted in 1 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 3, at 172.
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mechanistic model of associationism, late-nineteenth-century
physiological psychologists proposed the idea of a reflex arc for
understanding mental activity. The concept of the reflex arc
represented mental activity in three stages: “sensory stimulus, central
activity (or idea), and motor discharge or response.”360 Rejecting both
associationist and physiological views, John Dewey published a
critical review of the reflex arc theory in which he developed the
functionalist conception of mental activity.361 According to Dewey,
the three stages of the reflex arc are really a single integrated act in a
series of related acts that constitute human behavior.362 Mental
activity is never simply a response to a stimulus received from the
world, but a way of interacting with the world.363 For functionalists
such as Dewey, mental activity was viewed in terms of its useful
consequences.
Holmes shared the functionalists’ rejection of action as reflex
arc, but he did not share entirely their pragmatic concept of mental
activity. Action was most valuable for Holmes when it was
dangerous, not useful.364 Holmes explained the connection between
“dangerous action” and his soldier’s faith:
For high and dangerous action teaches us to believe as right beyond
dispute things for which our doubting minds are slow to find words
of proof. Out of heroism grows faith in the worth of heroism. The
proof comes later, and even may never come. Therefore I rejoice at
every dangerous sport which I see pursued. The students at Heidel-
berg, with their sword-slashed faces, inspire me with sincere re-
spect.365
It should come as no surprise that the man who attributed the
origins of the common law to the instinct for revenge gazed upon the
students of Heidelberg “with sincere respect.” The German student
duel, or Mensur as it was called, was a nineteenth-century event
360. H.S. Thayer, John Dewey 1859-1952, in AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 69, 76 (Marcus G.
Singer ed., 1985).
361. See John Dewey, The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology, 3 PSYCHOL. REV. 357 (1896).
362. See id. at 366-67.
363. See id. at 368.
364. See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Morris R. Cohen (Feb. 5, 1919), in The
Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, supra note 199, at 15 (“The useless is the ideal expression of
man.”); see also Howe, Introductory Notes, The Letters of Henry James supra note 202
(describing “the enthusiasm with which Holmes accepted a romantic faith that the justification
of action was not to be found in its purpose but in its vitality and its heroism”).
365. The Soldier’s Faith, supra note 34, at 489.
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popular among the university elite.366 In the words of a contemporary
German critic, the Mensur was a brutal reminder of “the savage
instincts” that lurk beneath the “starched shirts” of civilized German
life, a dramatic display of man’s innate aggression masquerading in
the name of honor.367 The respect Holmes felt for the students had
nothing to do with their defense of honor; it was their heroism—their
willingness to face the terror of the duel and to walk away alive but
scarred—that appealed to Holmes.
In contrast to useful action, which reflects the individual’s effort
to adapt to the world, dangerous action is individualistic and inward-
looking. Functionalist psychologists such as Dewey understood
mental activity in social terms: the focus was on the relationship
between ideas and the world, and the individual’s ability to adapt to
his or her environment.368 In contrast, Holmes viewed action as the
route to an inner faith; its value lay in its subjective meaning rather
than its objective consequences. Useful action was rational, whereas
dangerous action was often irrational and useless, or, as was the case
with the Heidelberg students, brutal and senseless sport.369 Any
dangerous activity, whether sport or war, sufficed to tap into the
individual’s unconscious will to triumph over fear and death. “I gaze
366. See GAY, THE CULTIVATION OF HATRED, supra note 46, at 9-33.
367. Id. at 12. The student duels, staged like a modern wrestling match, were bloody and
sordid dramas:
While the duel lacks all tension or charm, “the whole interest is centred in watching
the wounds. They come always in one of two places—on the top of the head or the
left side of the face.” And they provide an appalling spectacle. “Sometimes a portion
of hairy scalp or section of cheek flies up into the air, to be carefully preserved in an
envelope by its proud possessor, or, strictly speaking, its proud former possessor, and
shown round on convivial evenings.” As one might expect, from every wound there
“flows a plentiful stream of blood. It splashes doctors, seconds, and spectators; it
sprinkles ceilings and walls; it saturates the fighters, and makes pools for itself in the
sawdust. At the end of each round the doctors rush up, and with hands already drip-
ping with blood press together the gaping wounds, dabbing them with little balls of
wet cotton wool,” but inevitably, as soon as the duelists begin the next round, “the
blood gushes out again, half blinding them, and rendering the ground beneath slip-
pery.” The combatants’ appearance grows more and more bizarre. “Now and then
you see a man’s teeth laid bare almost to the ear, so that for the rest of the duel he
appears to be grinning at one half of the spectators, his other side remaining serious;
and sometimes a man’s nose gets slit, which gives to him as he fights a singularly
supercilious air.”
Id. at 11 (quoting JEROME K. JEROME, THREE MEN ON THE BUMMEL 205-06 (A. Sutton 1982)
(1900)).
368. See RYAN, supra note 255, at 367 (criticizing Dewey for his “unconcern with the
private world”).
369. See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Morris R. Cohen (Feb. 5, 1919), in The
Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, supra note 199, at 321 (referring to “the useless,” such as
“going to the North Pole,” as “the ideal expression of man”).
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with delight upon our polo players,” Holmes said. “If once in a while
in our rough riding a neck is broken, I regard it, not as a waste, but as
a price well paid for the breeding of a race fit for hardship and
command.”370 While he expressed genuine sorrow over the loss of
friends in the war, as in his tribute to Henry Abbott, Holmes’s
aristocratic regard for those heroic individuals who display courage in
the midst of danger is indisputable. Holmes was egalitarian when it
came to the opportunity to enter the race of life, but he believed in
winning and expressed no sympathy for those unfortunate individuals
unable or unwilling to compete.371
Holmes became convinced that the soldier’s faith could be found
through the study of law.372 In a lecture delivered to Harvard students
in 1886, Holmes said:
No man has earned the right to intellectual ambition until he has
learned to lay his course by a star which he has never seen,—to dig
by the divining rod for springs which he may never reach. In saying
this, I point to that which will make your study heroic. For I say to
you in all sadness of conviction, that to think great thoughts you
must be heroes as well as idealists. Only when you have worked
alone,—when you have felt around you a black gulf of solitude more
isolating than that which surrounds the dying man, and in hope and
in despair have trusted to your own unshaken will,—then only will
you have achieved. Thus only can you gain the secret isolated joy of
the thinker, who knows that, a hundred years after he is dead and
forgotten, men who never heard of him will be moving to the meas-
ure of his thought,—the subtle rapture of a postponed power, which
the world knows not because it has no external trappings, but which
to his prophetic vision is more real than that which commands an
army. And if this joy should not be yours, still it is only thus that you
can know that you have done what it lay in you to do,—can say that
you have lived, and be ready for the end.373
370. The Soldier’s Faith, supra note 34, at 489.
371. See THE COMMON LAW, supra note 6, at 50-51.
372. Speaking to students at Harvard, Holmes voiced this view:
But to those who believe with me . . . that to know is not less than to feel, I say—and
I say no longer with any doubt—that a man may live greatly in the law as well as
elsewhere; that there as well as elsewhere his thought may find its unity in an infinite
perspective; that there as well as elsewhere he may wreak himself upon life, may
drink the bitter cup of heroism, may wear his heart out after the unattainable.
The Profession of the Law, supra note 10, at 472.
373. Id. at 472-73.
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Through the solitude of study, Holmes believed that the legal
thinker would, like the soldier, reach that state of inner transcen-
dence “more isolating than that which surrounds the dying man” and
which, in language recalling Fichte, leads the individual to trust in his
“own unshaken will.” The true solitude of the legal thinker is itself a
kind of dangerous action that puts the individual in touch with innate
and unconscious capacities and ideas: the inner voice of nature, the
flame that burns within, that “unspeakable somewhat.” The
“imaginative impulse” that Holmes found lacking in empirical
psychology was both the irrational and the sublime element in human
nature:
But I doubt if there is any more exalted form of life than that of a
great abstract thinker, wrapt in the successful study of problems to
which he devotes himself, for an end which is neither unselfish nor
selfish in the common sense of those words, but is simply to feed the
deepest hunger and to use the greatest gifts of his soul.374
As expressed by Holmes, the Romantic view that unites the
soldier and the solitary thinker elevates feeling and will over rational
intellect, subjective faith over empirical truth, unconscious faculties
and emotions over conscious perception.
Holmes went a long way toward developing a rational study of
law that emphasized empirical methods and social sciences, but the
rational study of law, like empirical psychology, was never sufficient.
He admonished Harvard students to be “heroes as well as
idealists,”375 and credited both James and Dewey, pragmatists who
appreciated mind as a useful tool for making things work, for their
idealism.376 Holmes was also far more pessimistic than the
evolutionary social scientists and functional psychologists of his day.
By temperament, Holmes was closer to the pessimism of the early-
eighteenth-century Romantics than the optimism of the late-
eighteenth-century pragmatists and social scientists.377 He never
374. Law in Science, supra note 33, at 451-52, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 3, at 412.
375. The Profession of the Law, supra note 10, at 472.
376. See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Frederick Pollock (May 15, 1931), in 2
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 286-87 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941) (praising Dewey’s
idealism); Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to William James (Mar. 24, 1907), quoted in
2 PERRY, supra note 314, at 459-61 (praising James’s idealism).
377. While heroism and individualism were both themes of high Romanticism, see GAY,
THE NAKED HEART, supra note 285, at 38, 157-70, the beauty of their lyrical verses could not
mask the Romantic obsession with the irrational and the depraved in human nature.
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claimed to want to change the world, or to reform human nature;
rather, he believed law could be made to fit better the conditions of
human struggle and the innate drives of human nature.
The Romantic view of human nature that runs through Holmes’s
published writings and speeches had clear implications for his ideas
about law. There is the strong likelihood, discussed earlier, that
Holmes’s conception of unconscious motivations led him to reject
subjective standards of liability as too speculative for legal
decisionmaking. In addition, the notion that individuals are governed
by innate passions, such as revenge, over which they have little
control, was to Holmes a psychological truth that must be taken into
account by legal decisionmakers when formulating social policy. But
Holmes’s ideas about human nature were not limited to the study of
legal rules and law reform. As we have seen, he also drew upon his
psychological theory in the process of developing a vision of
professional life. Holmes often portrayed the lawyer as a servant to
the “bad man,” whose task was to predict how judges would actually
decide particular legal issues. From the standpoint of Holmes’s
prediction theory, the lawyer facilitates the client’s wishes by
predicting the legal consequences of behavior. But the view of the
lawyer as technician was never the whole picture, for Holmes also
promoted, in the ideal of the solitary hero, a Romantic account of
lawyering that redeemed the lawyer-philosopher from moral
relativism.378
Holmes’s struggle to construct a Romantic view of human nature
took place at a time when many nineteenth-century thinkers were
engaged in an effort to find meaning in a world increasingly
secularized by the magnificent successes of the new experimental
sciences. The Romantic ideas that informed Holmes’s jurisprudence,
however, need not be taken to deny that Holmes valued empirical
knowledge. His appreciation for scientific empiricism itself had roots
378. See Luban, Judicial Restraint, supra note 31, at 467 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR., Commencement Address, Brown University, in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.,
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 164, 164 (1920); The Profession of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS, supra, at 29, 30; The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra, at 167,
202):
Importantly, Holmes found that the profession of law, which he initially regarded as
“a thick fog of details—in a black and frozen night, in which were no flowers, no
spring, no easy joys,” was actually a region in which “thought may find its unity in an
infinite perspective,” in which you can “connect your subject with the universe and
catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the
universal law.”
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in the Romantic tradition, for, as discussed earlier, most Romantic
writers and philosophers viewed the faculty of creative imagination
as a higher, but supplemental, power to that of reason. For the
Romantics, the Enlightenment philosophes had made a tragic
mistake of emphasis: they erred in believing that reason and science
were the only important means for understanding the world. In
contrast, many Romantics used verse and prose to harness the
chaotic and transcendent power of the imagination to the boundaries
of reason. Holmes certainly never lost faith in the usefulness of
science and reason, but rather attempted to enrich his understanding
of the empirical world with a deeper and more meaningful vision of
the human beings who inhabit it.
CONCLUSION
The remoter and more general aspects of the law are those which
give it universal interest. It is through them that you not only be-
come a great master in your calling, but connect your subject with
the universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfa-
thomable process, a hint of the universal law.379
In his biography of Holmes, Mark DeWolfe Howe tells us that
Harold Laski asked an elderly Holmes to describe how he had come
upon the idea of comparative historical work that resulted in The
Common Law. Holmes replied in a revealing passage: “You ask me
what started my book. Of course I can’t answer for unconscious
elements. . . . I think the movement came from within—from the
passionate demand that what sounded so arbitrary in Blackstone, for
instance, should give some reasonable meaning . . . .”380 Even late in
life, long after he had finished his most important jurisprudential
writing, Holmes’s appreciation for the way in which unconscious
elements and inner passions direct human beings in their affairs
remained strong. It may be asking too much of intellectual history to
forge a connection between this Romantic strain in Holmes’s work
and the psychoanalytic psychology developed by Freud during the
379. The Path of the Law, supra note 3, at 478, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 3, at 406.
380. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold J. Laski (June 1, 1922), in 1
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 429-30 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953), quoted in HOWE, THE
PROVING YEARS, supra note 90, at 148-49.
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same period.381 Yet one close friend of Holmes drew just this
connection. In a letter to Holmes written in 1929, Sir Frederick
Pollock aptly observed that “[t]he sound foundation of Freud’s (if his
followers don’t wrong him) crazy sky-scraper seems to have been
discovered by you long ago.”382 Pollock was right to note that
Holmes’s work foreshadowed, in rough outline at least, fundamental
aspects of Freud’s psychology, particularly the notions of instinctual
drives, unconscious passions, conflict and irrationality.383 Nevertheless
Holmes belonged more to the generation of early-nineteenth-century
Romantics than to the generation of Freudian psychologists who
came of age in the early twentieth century. Unlike Freud, who
considered himself a scientific observer of the unconscious mind,
Holmes seemed content to conceive of the unconscious in
imaginative and transcendental terms.
We are left to ponder the fact that the century’s most eloquent
and influential advocate of the reasonable man standard was also an
irrepressible Romantic when it came to human nature. As suggested
in this Article, Holmes most likely advocated the external standard of
liability because he believed that subjective motivations are not easily
accessible to legal proof. Unfortunately, Holmes’s belief in the
external standard has contributed to a behaviorist orientation in law
that downplays or ignores altogether the importance of unconscious
forces in human affairs. In contrast to Holmes, contemporary legal
scholars seem largely oblivious to the existence or importance of
unconscious influences on human behavior.384 The debate over
381. Two years after Holmes published The Path of the Law, Freud launched his brilliant
assault on the idea of rationality and free will, with The Interpretation of Dreams.
382. Letter from Sir Frederick Pollock to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Aug. 16, 1929), in 2
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 376, at 251.
383. Holmes read The Interpretation of Dreams in 1914. He commented on it in a letter to
Einstein:
I am engaged with Freud on The Interpretation of Dreams of which I have heard talk.
I think it must suffer very severely even in the substance of the argument from
translation, but it is interesting. Ladies should be warned not to tell very innocent
sounding dreams in public. An umbrella, unlike its behaviour in day life, generally is
an instrument capable of begetting offspring. And going upstairs—well—there you
are. The remoteness of the pictures from what Freud says they mean is amazing. He
is a doctor, I think of great experience, and I don’t doubt knows what he is talking
about, but his statements and arguments in the translation, it seems to me, have to be
taken a good deal on faith.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Lewis Einstein (July 20, 1914), in THE HOLMES-
EINSTEIN LETTERS, supra note 118, at 98.
384. For an important exception, see ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PASSION: AN
ESSAY ON PERSONALITY (1984).
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individual autonomy, for example, which occupies the attention of so
many constitutional and political theorists, remains for the most part
devoid of psychological understanding. Holmes understood the
importance of psychology to the study of law, and this insight, along
with his Romantic ideas about human nature, remain a vital part of
his legacy.
